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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3)(i), as this is an
appeal from a final judgment and order in a civil case.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The three issues upon which the trial court ruled and which
are now properly presented for review are:
1.

A surety is not liable on a Section 63-56-38 public

project payment bond for damages to a subcontractor's equipment
v^en the damage is caused by the general contractor's
negligence.
2.

A surety is not liable on a Section 63-56-38 public

project payment bond for damages to a subcontractor's equipment
when the damage is caused by the general contractor's breach of
contract.
3.

A surety is entitled to escrow funds under the

principles of subrogation, exoneration and quia timet, where the
escrow funds were paid by the owner, where the surety has fully
performed under its bond obligations, and where the surety has
fulfilled the obligations of the general contractor and paid
proper bond claims.
Respondent Reliance Insurance Co. (hereinafter "Reliance")
is dissatisfied with Appellants Transport Leasing Company's and
Transystems, Inc.'s (hereinafter "Transport") characterization
of the issues and therefore provides this statement of issues
pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
Transport's statement of the issues mischaracterizes the issues

1

which were decided by the District Court and are beyond the
proper standard of review.
infra at 9-11.

See Standard of Review argument

Reliance's statement of issues accurately

reflects those issues decided by the District Court.

See Order

Granting Partial Summary Judgment, attached and marked Addendum
"A" at paragraph 2 and 3; Final Order and Judgment, attached and
marked Addendum "B" at paragraph 2.
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. Section 63-56-38 (1986 Replacement)
(attached and marked as Addendum nCff) is determinative of the
issues on appeal in this case:
63-56-38. Bonds necessary when contract
is awarded.
(1) When a construction contract is awarded,
the following bonds or security shall be
delivered to the state and shall become
binding on the parties upon the execution
of the contract:
. . .

(b) a payment bond satisfactory to
the state . . . for the protection of
all persons supplying labor and material
to the contractor or its subcontractors for
the performance of the work provided for
in the contract.
. . .

(3) Any person who has furnished labor
or material to the contractor or subcontractor for the work provided for in
the contract, in respect of which a
payment bond is furnished under this
section, who has not been paid in full
therefor within 90 days from the date on
which the last of the labor was performed
by him or material was supplied by him for
which the claim is made, may sue on the
payment bond for any amount unpaid at the
time the suit is instituted and may
prosecute the action for the amount due
him. Any person having a contract with a
subcontractor of the contractor, but not
express or implied contract with the contractor furnishing the payment bond, has
2

a right of action upon the payment bond
upon giving written notice to the contractor within 90 days from the date on
which such person performed the last of
the labor or supplied the last of the
material for which the claim is made. . . .
Transport erroneously relies upon Utah Code Ann. Section
14-1-13 (repealed 1987) and erroneously states that Section
63-56-38 did not become effective until April 27, 1987. Brief
of Appellants, p.3 at footnote.

With the exception of minor

changes which do not affect any issue before this Court,
Sections 63-56-38 as quoted herein became effective July 1,
1980.

Section 63-56-2 (1986 replacement, Compiler's Notes)

("The term 'effective date of this chapter [63-56-1 to
63-56-73],' means July 1, 1980 . . . . " ) .

L. A. Young's

contract with the State was signed May 13, 1985, and is
therefore governed by Sections 63-56-38.
The Utah Procurement Code, of which Section 63-56-38 is a
part, applies to "every expenditure of public funds . . . by any
state agency under any contract."
63-56-2(2) (1986 replacement).

Utah Code Ann. Section

The Utah Procurement Code

superseded Section 14-1-13 as far as Section 14-1-13?s state
provisions were concerned.

From the Procurement Code's

enactment until Section 14-1-13's repeal, Section 14-1-13 only
applied to municipalities and not to state procurement.

Section

14-1-17 (1986 replacement) specifically provides that 14-1-13
"shall apply only to those political entities not subject to the
provisions of Chapter 56, Title 63."
Transport also erroneously states that "it would be
immaterial as to which [statute] was applicable."
3

Brief of

Appellants, p.3 at footnote.

If Section 14-1-13 were

applicable, the prevailing party would receive attorneys fees.
As much as respondent would like to recover what it has expended
in this lengthy action, the applicable statute, Section
63-56-38, does not provide for attorneys' fees.

The applicable

statute, therefore, is Section 63-56-38 of the Utah Procurement
Code.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of Proceedings

Transport Leasing Company and Transystems, Inc.
(Transport), were plaintiffs in Civil No. 85-8421 (R. at 2-24)
and defendants in Civil No. C87-1984 (R. at 447-461).
appellants in this appeal.

They are

Respondent is Reliance Insurance

Company (Reliance), who was defendant in Civil No. 85-8421 and
plaintiff in Civil No. C87-1984. Transport filed the first
complaint on December 13, 1985 (Civil No. 85-8421) (attached and
marked Addendum "D"), alleging causes of action in negligence
and breach of contract.

Reliance filed its own action on March

20, 1987 (Civil No. C87-1984), seeking to declare Reliance's
rights in certain escrow funds to be superior and prior to all
other competing rights.

The two actions were subsequently

consolidated.
The District Court ruled on determinative issues in two
orders.

The first order was issued March 18, 1987. R. at

298-299; Addendum "A."

This order granted Reliance's Partial

The record on appeal is abbreviated as "R." and is
paginated according to the record on appeal.

4

Motion for Summary Judgment, ruled that a Section 63-56-38
payment bond does not cover damage to equipment caused by
negligence or breach of contract.

The second order, the Final

Order and Judgment, was issued September 14, 1987. R. at
667-671; Addendum "B." In the Final Order, the District Court
ordered that Reliance is entitled to all the funds in the escrow
account based on its right of subrogation to the contract
proceeds.

Addendum "A," paragraph 2.

All issues between

Transport and Reliance were decided by summary judgment.
Addendum

ff

B," paragraph 4.
B. Relevant Facts

The facts of this case and the parties involved are typical
of construction contract disputes.

A general contractor (L. A.

Young Sons Construction Company, hereinafter "L. A. Young")
contracted with an owner (State of Utah, hereinafter "the
State") to build a section of highway.

L. A. Young was required

by statute to furnish bonds, and did furnish performance and
payment bonds.

L. A. Young was principal, the State was obligee

and Reliance was surety.

R. at 457; Payment Bond, attached and

marked Addendum "E."
L. A. Young entered into a Leasing Agreement (R. at 9-14;
attached and marked Addendum "F") with Transport.
Agreement was drafted by Transport's counsel.

The Leasing
2

R. at 702.

The

Leasing Agreement provided that Transport would furnish trucks
and belly-dump trailers to L. A. Young for handling and hauling
g
The record on appeal merely designates the deposition of
Calvin L. Rampton as "R. at 706." Attached and marked Addendum
"G" are the pertinent pages of Mr. Rampton's deposition.
5

sand, gravel, fill materials and similar substances for the
highway project.

Pursuant to the Leasing Agreement, Transport

promised to provide maintenance, licensing, insurance, permits,
drivers and two full-time supervisors to monitor L. A. Young's
lease obligations.

Addendum "F," paragraph 2.

Transport claims that the rented equipment was damaged and
that the "repairs to such tractor and trailer units . . . were
caused by the negligence or intentional wrongdoing of L. A.
Young Sons Construction Company. . . . "
paragraph 7.

Addendum "D", page 3,

In addition to its claims of '"willful misconduct"

and "negligence," Transport further claims that the alleged
damage resulted from the "breach" of certain contractual
provisions of the Leasing Agreement.

Addendum "D", page 5,

paragraph 10.
During the course of the project and thereafter, a dispute
arose between Transport and L. A. Young concerning the amounts
due to Transport for the truck and trailer rental.

Transport

and L. A. Young agreed to have contract proceeds which were paid
by the State deposited in an escrow account pending the
resolution of the dispute.

R. at 20-23; Escrow Agreement,

attached and marked Addendum "H." Reliance stipulated to the
amount of rent owed.

R. at 550-552; Stipulation, attached and

marked Addendum "I." The amount of rent owed to Transport is no
longer disputed.
During the course of construction, L. A. Young became
unable, both financially and otherwise, to perform the work
required on the project and to pay for the labor and materials
6

required.

L. A. Young was unable to meet and fulfill its

contractual obligations, and was in default of its contractual
obligations.

R. at 463, paragraph 4.

Pursuant to its suretyship duties under the payment and
performance bonds, Reliance financially assisted L. A. Young,
paid material suppliers and laborers, and performed the
obligations of L. A. Young under the contract.

In the course of

completing performance on the contract, Reliance expended its
own money and incurred a loss of more than $1.2 million.

R.

at 464, paragraphs 5 and 6.
Certain officers and others associated with L. A. Young
executed two indemnity agreements in favor of Reliance.

R.

at 534 and 538; Indemnity Agreements, attached and marked
Addendum "J."

Under the fourth paragraph of the Indemnity

Agreement, L. A. Young assigned to Reliance all right, title,
and interest of L. A. Young in the contract payments from the
State.

The sixth paragraph of the Indemnity Agreements provides

that the entire contract price of the contracts referred to in
any bonds are impressed with a trust in favor of the surety
(Reliance) for payment of obligations incurred for labor,
material, and services in the performance of the contract*work
for which the surety would be liable under the bonds and for the
purpose of satisfying the conditions of the bond executed in
connection with the contract.
C.

Disposition of the Trial Court

All issues between Transport and Reliance were decided by
summary judgment.

Through the Final Order and Judgment the

7

District Court ruled that Reliance is entitled to all of the
funds in the escrow account based upon its rights of subrogation
to the contract proceeds.

The District Court ruled that the

statutory payment bonds do not cover damage to equipment caused
by negligence or misuse of L. A. Young, or damage caused by any
breach of contract, and that Reliance is not liable therefor.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The critical question in this case is whether Reliance is
liable for damages to Transport's equipment.

Transport does not

allege the damages were caused by Reliance; Transport claims
Reliance is liable under the statutory payment bond.
The legal issue is not whether a surety is liable for costs
of repair to equipment.

The issue is whether a surety is liable

on a statutory payment bond for damages (repairs) caused by the
principal's negligence or breach of contract.
As a matter of surety law, a surety is not liable on its
payment bond for the negligent or willful misconduct of the
principal.

Therefore, Reliance is not liable on the payment

bond for damages caused to Appellant's equipment as the result
of L. A. Young's negligence.
Likewise, a surety is not liable on its payment bond for
damages caused by the principal's breach of contract.

Reliance,

therefore, is not liable on the payment bond for damages caused
to Appellant's equipment as a result of L. A. Young's breach of
contract.
Even if this Court refuses to rule that a surety is not
liable for a principal's negligence, as a matter of law Reliance

8

is still not liable under the statutory payment bond for repairs
to Appellant's equipment.
In addition, a surety is entitled to contract proceeds
under the principles of subrogation, exoneration and quia timet
when the surety has stepped into the principal's shoes by
fulfilling the principal's obligations.

Reliance assumed the

obligations of L. A. Young by completing the work and paying the
debts of L. A. Young.

Through the principles of subrogation,

exoneration and quia timet, as well as the indemnity agreements
it executed with L. A. Young, Reliance has prior and superior
rights to the funds which were placed in escrow.
These issues—no liability for negligence or breach of
contract and the surety's legal right to the escrow funds—were
the only issues which were decided by the District Court.
Moreover, these issues were properly decided on summary
judgment, there being no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Notwithstanding the facts which Transport may assert, Reliance
is entitled to the order and judgment received as a matter of
law.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
I. Under the Proper Standard of Review
the Final Order and Judgment Should be Affirmed
Although this Court may view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the losing party, it should still find the District
Court properly granted summary judgment.

In reviewing this

case, this Court should find that summary judgment was proper
since there are no genuine issues of material fact and Reliance

9

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

R. Utah S.C. 3(a);

Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c).
Review is limited to issues pertaining to final orders and
judgments.

The two final orders and judgments of the District

Court are the Final Order and Judgment and the Order Granting
Partial Judgment in Favor of Defendant Reliance Insurance
Company.

Addenda "A" and

ff

B." The legal issues upon which the

District Court ruled as final and which may be properly reviewed
by this Court are fully set forth in the Statement of Issues in
this Respondent's Brief.

These legal issues are: (1) whether a

surety is liable for the principal's negligence, (2) whether a
surety is liable for the principal's breach of contract, and (3)
whether a surety is entitled to escrow funds where the surety is
subrogated to the principal's rights.
Only facts which pertain to these issues on appeal are
material.

Transport alleges many facts in its brief and

attempts to establish a cause of action in negligence against L.
A. Young.

See Brief of Appellants, p.7 and 8.

The fact that L.

A. Young may have committed the acts which are alleged in
Transport's brief has no bearing on the legal issues decided by
the District Court.

The District Court ruled that a surety is

not liable for a principal's negligence.

That is the issue

before this Court; the issue is not whether L. A. Young, the
principal, was negligent.

Only disputes over facts which might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude entry of summary judgment.

10

Unnecessary or

irrelevant disputes should not be considered.

L & A Drywall

Inc. v, Whitmore Construction Co., 608 P.2d 626 (Utah 1980).
In addition, more than two and one half years passed
between the time Transport filed its complaint and the time the
Final Order and Judgment was issued.

Transport had ample time

to present material facts and argue its points.

The District

Judge had all the material facts, issues and arguments before it
when he ruled on summary judgment.

An appeal to the Supreme

Court is not the place to raise new issues and arguments.
Transport cannot prevail on appeal by raising issues and
arguments that it did not raise below.

See Yost v. State, 640

P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981); L & A Drywall Inc. v. Whitmore
Construction Co., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980).

Transport

failed to dispute the facts set forth by Reliance at the time of
the summary judgment hearing.

Transport also failed to present

evidence on issues where it would carry the burden at trial.
short, this case was ripe for summary judgment.

As stated by

the United States Supreme Court:
Summary Judgment procedure is properly
regarded . . . as an integral part of the
Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to "secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every
action."
Celotex Corp. v. Catratt, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2555 (1986).
This Court should also focus only on facts which are
material to those issues which were the subject of a final
determination by the District Court.

11

In

II. Transport's Claim is Contrary to the Proper
Nature and Function of Sureties and Payment Bonds
The answers to the legal questions before this Court are
found in surety law.

An understanding of the nature and

function of sureties and payment bonds is an essential
foundation for determining the issues here on appeal.
A surety is a special kind of accommodation party; it is
different from an insurer, indemnitor or endorser.
& Design Law Section 31.1a (1986).

Construction

Moreover, a surety's

responsibilities and liabilities depend upon the type of bond in
question.

In the case at bar, this Court will be dealing with a

statutory payment bond.
The necessity for and the terms of a statutory bond are
prescribed by statute.

Capriotti, Lemon & Associates v. Johnson

Service Co., 84 Nev. 318, 440 P.2d 386 (1968).

In a statutory

bond, the liability of the surety will depend not only upon the
terms of the bond but also upon the terms of the statute and
principles of public policy.

Employment Security Commission v.

C.R. Davis Contracting Co., 81 N.M. 23, 462 P.2d 608 (1969).

The terms of the statute requiring the bond will be read into it
as if they were expressly included in the bond. Houston General
Insurance Co. v. Maples, 375 So. 2d 1012 (Miss. 1979).
The terms of the payment bond itself limit payment to labor
or materials provided in the "prosecution of the work provided
for in [the] contract."

Addendum "E." The bond limits

Reliance's liability according to the governing statute, which
statute also limits coverage to labor and materials supplied
"for the performance of the work provided for in the contract."
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Utah Code Ann. Section 63-56-38(1)(b).

Damages for negligence

or even repairs were not provided for in the contract, bond or
statute.
Statutes which require bonds also set rules for recovery on
them.

For example, notice requirements are set forth so that

the surety and contractor will know of the claims against them.
Similarly, limitation periods are established.

The limitations

found in bonding statutes are quite often shorter than the
statutes of limitations governing contracts generally.

Thus,

the surety will often benefit from the statutory requirements.
On public construction projects, the bond provides
protection for laborers and material suppliers who could not
file a lien on the public property and could not otherwise
recover for their services if the contractor became insolvent.
Courts have no problem in allowing recovery on a payment bond to
claimants who have furnished materials which go directly into
the work and become part of the finished structure.

These

claimants are entitled to a mechanics' lien on private projects,
and it is primarily for their benefit that payment bonds are
executed on public projects.

At one time, these claimants were

the only people entitled to sue on the payment bond.

In some

jurisdictions, absent sovereign immunity, recovery on the
payment bond is still limited to those claimants who could
validly execute a lien under the applicable lien law.

See

Norris v. Depew Paving Co. 14 A.D.2d 117, 217 N.Y.S.2d 203
(1961), afffd, 11 N.Y.2d 812, 182 N.E.2d 109, 227 N.Y.S.2d 436
(1962).
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The law governing recovery under statutory payment bonds,
therefore, is unique.

Recovery is expressly limited by the

terms of the statute.

Likewise, the surety's liability is not

all-inclusive; its role is well defined and limited.
II. A Surety is not Liable on a Payment
Bond for Damages to a Subcontractor's
Equipment when the Damage is caused by
General Contractor's Negligence
A. Utah Code Ann. Section 63-56-38
Limits Recovery on its Payment Bond
to "Furnished Labor or Material"
The ultimate issue in this case is whether Reliance is
liable for damages caused by L. A. Young's negligence or breach
of contract.

Because Transport's cause of action is created by

statute, Transport's claim must be based upon, and is limited
by, the applicable statute which created the cause of action.
First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 361 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981).
The statute under which Transport's cause of action was
created also limits Transport's cause of action by (1) subject
and (2) limitation period.

In Section 63-56-38(4), the statute

limits the time for filing suit under the statute to one year.
In Section 63-56-38(3), the statute limits the subject—what is
covered by the bond--to labor or materials furnished for the
work provided in the contract.

The statute limits—not

expands—the Reliance's exposure to liability.
The statute provides recovery only for payment to "persons
supplying labor and material . . . for the performance of the
work provided for in the contract."
63-56-38.

Utah Code Ann. Section

The statute clearly and specifically covers only
14

labor and material which were supplied for the performance of
the work provided for in the contract.

Clearly, claimed damages

to heavy equipment caused by the contractor's negligence is not
"work provided for in the contract."
B.

Reliance is not Liable for L. A. Young's Negligence

Many cases hold that the statutory bond required in the
case of public works does not render the surety liable for
injuries to property or repairs to the claimant's property due
3
to the contractor's negligence.
Of particular help are two recent cases which directly
analyze the issue of whether a surety is liable for damages
caused by the principal's negligence.

The first case, Sim's

Crane Service Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co., 667 F.2d 30 (11th
Cir. 1982), involved facts very similar to those which are now
before this Court.

A lessor, like Transport, leased heavy

equipment, a crane, to a subcontractor.

Also like the case now

Sim's Crane Service, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co.f 667
F.2d 30, 32 (11th Cir. 1982) ("The terms of the surety bond,
therefore, do not indicate an intention to benefit materialmen
whose property is damaged as the result of a subcontractor's
negligence."); Wyatt & Kipper Engineers, Inc. v. Ramstad
Construction Co., 194 F. Supp. 379, 382 (D. Alaska 1961) ("On
the other hand, it is held that there is no such remedy against
the surety for breach of contract pertaining to labor or
materials furnished, such as damages for delay, or failure to
take and pay for equipment never received, or for negligence.");
J. W. Crowder v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 144 F. Supp. 322, 329
(W.D. La. 1956) ("[T]he surety company's liability would be
limited to the claims based on work done and material furnished
as distinguished from claims based upon negligence and breach of
contract."); Coken v. Di Sandro, 88 F. Supp. 970 (D. Conn. 1949)
("The second count is founded in part on negligence and cannot
be said to be for material and labor furnished."); City of
Oneonta v. P. A. Buchanan Contracting Co., 318 So. 2d 267, 269
(Ala. 1975) ("A public works bond surety is not liable to third
parties for injuries caused by negligence of the [continued on
following page]
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before this Court, the crane "was damaged at the job site as a
result of alleged negligent operation by the subcontractor's
employees."

Id. at 31.

Certain facts in the Sim's case were very favorable to the
subcontractor.

For example, the language of the bond expressly

provided for "the payment of all persons furnishing materials
for the prosecution of the work provided for in the general
contract including 'repairs on machinery.'" Id*

Notwithstanding

these facts, the Court of Appeals ruled that the surety should
not be responsible for repairs caused by negligence.
The Court of Appeals followed what it called the "general
rule":
[W]hile there may be a recovery on a
public contractor's bond for material
and labor used in incidental and current
repairs to the contractor's machinery,
there can be none for major repairs
involving the replacement of old with
new parts, in the absence of proof that
the new parts were consumed in the work
covered by the bond. The determinative
distinction is between the items going
into the work, or specifically contributing to the execution of the contract
and nothing else, and those properly
chargeable to the plant and equipment of
the contractor, and available not only
for the pending work but also for other
work as well.
contractor-principal."); McGee Steel Co. v. McDonald Industries
Alaska, Inc., 723 P.2d 611, 618 (Alaska 1986) ("We conclude that
a subcontractor's negligent damage to a major piece of equipment
was not an expense which [the surety] should have expected.");
Healy Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Minneapolis-Saint Paul
Sanitary District, 169 N.W.2d 50 (Minne. 1969) (Public liability
or damage claims based upon negligence or accidents which arise
out of the performance of a bonded project are not proper bond
claims.).
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Id. at 32 (quoting Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Fullton, 60
6a. App. 710, 712, 4 S.E.2d 690f 691 (1930)).
The Court of Appeals supported the general rule with this
sound reasoning:
Similarly, the surety, in executing the
payment bond, did not intend to insure
materialmen against the negligence of
subcontractors or underwrite a liability
policy for subcontractors. To require
payment from the surety to lessor materialmen for machinery repair costs,
whenever a subcontractor damages the
machinery, would unduly enlarge the
risk undertaken by the surety for which
it was compensated.
Id. at 32.
The second case, McGee Steel Co. v. McDonald Industries
Alaska Inc., 723 P.2d 611 (Alaska 1986), follows the rule and
reason of Sim's.

The McGee facts are also very similar to those

facts now before this Court.
equipment to a subcontractor.

In McGee, a lessor leased heavy
The public project required that

a payment bond be issued according to the terms of a "Little
Miller Act," a statute which is very much like the statute at
issue in this case.

Like Utah's payment bond statute, Alaska

Stat. Section 36.25.010 also requires the contractor to furnish
a payment bond "for the protection of all persons who provide
labor and material in the prosecution of the work provided for
in the contract."
Much of the McGee case is devoted to questions of liability
as between the lessee and the lessor.

However, the McGee court

does not stop with a determination that the principal is or is
not liable to the lessor for repair costs and then automatically
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assess the surety with liability.

The McGee court takes the

next step and discusses the extent of the surety's liability,
recognizing that a surety's liability on a statutory payment
bond is limited.
In the case now before this Court, Transport strenuously
argues that L. A. Young was negligent.
so.

That may or may not be

However, Transport must realize that rejpair costs caused by

negligence are beyond the surety's scope of liability.

The

McGee court analyzed the issue and held:
The question in this case is
whether damage to the crane caused
by any negligence of [the principal]
can be considered an "expected consumption" of the equipment on the
job. We conclude that a subcontractor's negligent damage to a
major piece of equipment was not an
expense which [the surety] should
have expected. Therefore, [the
surety] is not liable for these
repair costs.
McGee, 723 P.2d at 618.
Transport has continuously alleged "excessive,"
"extensive," "extraordinary" and "negligent" damage to its
equipment.

The cases which have been cited hold that a surety

is not liable for the principal's negligence because a surety's
liability under a statutory payment bond is limited.

As a

matter of law, a surety is not liable for damages caused by
negligence.
Even in light of this "general rule," Sim's, 667 F.2d at
30, Transport has chosen to rely heavily on an older case from
Rhode Island, Moran Towing Corp. v. M. A. Gammino Construction
Co., 363 F.2d 108 (1st 1966) (hereinafter "Moran 3").
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The five Moran cases deal mainly with negligence and
apportionment of damages.

Moran Towing Corp. v. M. A. Gammino

Construction Co., 204 F. Supp. 353 (1962) (hereinafter "Moran
1") , initially held that a subcontractor has no remedy against a
surety on a Miller Act bond for recovery of damages caused by
the principal's negligence.

Id. at 356.

However, in granting

the defendant surety company's motion to dismiss, the Court also
granted leave to the plaintiff to amend its complaint to allege
a proper bond claim action.

In the case at bench, Transport's

motion to amend its complaint was denied.

Transport has not

appealed that order.
Moran Towing Corp. v. M. A. Gammino Construction Co., 244
F. Supp. 729 (D.R.I. 1965) (hereinafter "Moran 2"), consolidated
Moran 1 with another action which was brought in admiralty.

The

Moran 2 court did not address the issue of the surety's
liability for the principal's negligence.
In Moran 3, the court did address the issues which now
concern the case at bar.

The court acknowledged many cases

which hold that a surety is not liable for the principal's
negligence and noted the risk of creating "an entirely new type
of insurance coverage."

Id., at 115. The court even recognized

that the Miller Act was meant as a substitute for liens which
might otherwise have been claimed against the government.
However, in recognizing this substitution, the court failed to
recognize that such a recovery for negligence under the Miller
Act would not be available under a typical mechanics' lien
recovery.
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The court rationalized the general rule which prohibits
recovery on a bond on account of a principal's negligence by
reasoning that the principal had assumed the potential costs of
its negligence as a portion of its own contract.

The fact that

a principal may agree to pay for its own negligence does not
change the sound law that a payment bond surety is not and
should not be liable for the principal's negligence.
The two subsequent Moran cases, Moran Towing Corp. v. M. A.
Gammino Construction Co., 292 F. Supp. 134 (D.R.I. 1968) and
Moran Towing Corp. v. M. A. Gammino Construction Co., 409 F.2d
917 (1969) dealt only with apportionment of damages issues; that
is, which portion of damages were attributable to the contractor
and which were attributable to the equipment supplier.
Only a brief passage in Moran 3 addresses the issues which
are before this court.

The Moran 3 decision looked at the law

which states that a surety is not liable for negligence and then
looked at the law which states that in certain situations a
surety may be liable for a subcontractor's equipment repair.
However, the decision did not adequately examine the
determinative issue before this Court of whether a surety is
liable for a subcontractor's repair of equipment, when the
repair is caused by the principal's negligence.
Moreover, even if this court were to accept the Moran
minority decision as law, the ultimately critical facts which
were present in that case are not present in the case at bar.
In the Moran cases, the contractor expressly accepted the
responsibility for its own negligence and contracted to pay for
20

that negligence.

In the case before this Court, no such express

assumption was made.

In the Moran cases, the record does not

mention if insurance was required to be carried by the
principal.

In the case at bar, Transport, not L. A. Young,

expressly agreed, by the terms of its own lease, that it would
provide insurance.

Transport certainly cannot argue now that

Reliance assumed the position of an insurer when it is obvious
that Transport by its own lease requirements had adequately
provided for insurance.
in the Moran decision.

This argument appeared to be persuasive
Transport's Lease Agreement expressly

provided insurance for Transport's equipment; Reliance did not
expressly or even impliedly assume the responsibilities of an
insurer.
The Moran decision should not be followed by this Court
because it is:

(1) minority law, (2) unpersuasive when

confronted with the reasoning and policy of majority law, and
(3) distinguishable from the case at bar as to critical facts,
and (4) distinguishable from the case at bar as to the
determinative issue.
C. Recovery on a Statutory Payment Bond is Meant
as a Substitute for Mechanics' Lien Rights; Transport
Could not Recover Its Damages under Mechanics' Lien Law
It is important to remember the reasons the Utah
Procurement Code requires a payment bond on public projects.
Material suppliers and subcontractors without contractual
privity have no contractual recourse against a public entity.
Moreover, subcontractors and material suppliers are prohibited
from recording mechanics' liens on public property.
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Utah Code

Ann. Section 63-56-38(3), the payment bond statute, operates as
a substitute for recording a mechanics' lien when subcontractors
and material suppliers are not paid for labor or materials
furnished on a public project.

New England Explosives Corp. v.

Maine Ledge Blasting Specialist, Inc., 542 F. Supp 1343 (D. Me.
1982) (purpose of Miller Act is to provide persons supplying
labor or materials with a suitable alternative to their state
law mechanics' lien remedy).
Section 63-56-38(3) acts as a substitute to the mechanics'
lien rights which are not allowed on public projects.
Therefore, if the "labor and materials furnished" definition of
Section 63-56-38(3) needs amplification, it is reasonable to
resort to the mechanics' lien statute, to apply, by analogy, the
criteria of the mechanics' lien to the bond statute.

"The

presence or absence of a right to assert a mechanics' lien can
be a guide to the interpretation of a payment bond."

United

States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Miller, 549 S.W.2d 316, 319
(Ky. App. 1977).
Although the Utah mechanics' lien statute lists many items
and services upon which a contractor may base a mechanics' lien
filing, no mention is made of negligence, breach of contract or
even repairs.

Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-3 (1987 supp.)

(Mechanics' Lien Statute, attached and marked Addendum "K").

By

analogy, negligence, breach of contract and repairs should not
be included within the scope of a payment bond provided by
Section 63-56-38(3).

To rule otherwise would be to give a

claimant under a payment bond greater rights than a mechanics'
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lien claimant would have under the mechanics' lien statute.
This would be a truly incongruent result since Section
63-56-38(3) was meant to substitute the mechanics' lien rights
which are not available on public projects.

L. W. Flynn

v.

W. P. Harlin Construction Co., 509 P.2d 356r 361 (Utah 1973)
("The purpose of the statues requiring the bonds . . . is to
provide the same protection to laborers and materialmen as to
those involved in private contracts.")
D.

Reliance is Not an Insurer and Should
Not be Forced to Perform as an Insurer

The District Court's ruling that a surety is not liable for
a principal's negligence or breach of contract is in no way a
blind adherence to meaningless law.

The rule that a surety is

not liable for a principal's negligence or breach of contract is
founded upon sound reasoning and public policy.
First, Transport had adequate recourse for its loss. The
Lease Agreement drafted by Transport specifically required
Transport to furnish insurance for the trucks and trailers it
rented to L. A. Young.

Addendum "F," paragraph 2.

In addition

to a possible recovery against L. A. Young for L. A. Young's
negligence, Transport could have also recovered from the
insurance which Transport itself promised to provide or from any
casualty or liability insurance L. A. Young had.

Transport's

Lease Agreement required Transport to carry liability insurance
in recognition of the fact that negligence and breach of
contract claims are not covered by the payment bond.

In fact,

standard form construction contracts include such provisions.
See J. Sweet, Sweet on Construction Industry Contracts, 459-61
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(1987), attached and marked Addendum "L."

The fact that

Transport did not pursue these avenues of recovery against
insurance companies should not be grounds for an unprecedented
recovery against a surety.
Second, the increased premiums which would result from a
ruling that sureties are liable for negligence and breach of
contract would be an extreme financial burden on all
contractors.

To rule that a surety is liable for the negligence

or breach of contract of the principal would substantially
increase the surety's exposure to liability, forcing sureties
either to raise bond premiums to cover the increased exposure or
to refuse to write bonds.

The subcontractors and suppliers who

are supposed to benefit from the bond statute's protection would
find the detriment outweighing the benefit.

Contractors

fortunate enough to obtain bonds would ultimately be forced
either to pass the increased rate to the owner or to pay less to
their subcontractors.
The Sim's court had in mind the concept of limiting a
surety's liability in order that the surety might better perform
its obligations when it explained:
To require payment from the surety to
lessor materialman for machinery repair costs, whenever a subcontractor
damages the machinery, would unduly
enlarge the risk undertaken by the
surety for which it was compensated.
Sim's, 667 F.2d at 32.
Sureties are an interdependent part of the construction
industry.

Drastically changing the surety's responsibilities

would damage, not benefit, the industry, with the ultimate
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increased cost passed through to the taxpayer—the person who
ultimately pays for public projects.
A third reason underlying the District Court's ruling that
a surety is not liable for the principal's negligence or breach
of contract is that a surety should not be made to act the part
of an insurer.

Important distinctions exist between the

function of sureties and insurers.

This distinction carries

over into the law which governs sureties.

For example, in

Meyer v. Building and Realty Service Co., 209 Ind. 125, 196 N.E.
250 (1935), the Supreme Court of Indiana distinguished an
insurance contract from a surety contract:
A contract of surety creates a
tripartite relation between the party
secured, the principal obligor, and
the party secondarily liable, and the
rights, remedies, and defenses of a
surety cannot be disassociated from
his relationship even though you call
the contract one of insurance. This
tripartite relation is always present
in a surety contract, while an insurance contract in itself never
creates a tripartite relation analogous to the surety relation . , . .
Insurance has been defined as a contract
whereby one undertakes to indemnify
another against loss, damage, or I
liability arising from an unknown or
contingent event; whereas the contract
of suretyship is one to answer for
the debt, default, or miscarriage of
another, and a contract of suretyship
is not altered because it was made
by a corporation for compensation.
Id. 196 N.E. at 253.
An insurer spreads the risk of certain loss among members
of a class.

The premium paid by a member of that class

constitutes that person's proportionate share of the risk.
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A

surety does not anticipate certain loss as does the insurer.
fact, a surety, by definition, expects no loss.

In

The premium

paid to a surety is more a service charge or a fee and not
compensation for undertaking a risk.

Unlike an insurer who,

having paid a loss, has no right of indemnification against its
insured, the surety has every right and intention to pursue its
principal and indemnitors until it is reimbursed.

The functions

of an insurer and a surety are substantially different.
Reliance, a surety, should not be forced to perform the
functions of an insurer.
III. A Surety is not Liable on a Payment Bond for
Damages to a Subcontractor's Equipment When
the Damage is Caused by the General Contractor's
Breach of Contract
The reasoning underlying the argument that a breach of
contract unrelated to the work is not a proper bond claim is
similar to the reasoning underlying the argument that negligence
is not a proper bond claim.

Reliance's liability is limited to

claims based on the work done or the materials furnished and
should not be based upon the principal's negligence or breach of
contract.

Section 63-56-38 of the Utah Procurement Code created

a cause of action not previously available at common law.
Because it created the cause of action, recovery is limited to
this statute's express terms.
Utah Procurement Code states that even those who are not in
privity of contract with the contractor are entitled to recover
from the surety, if their claims are proper bond claims.

In

other words, material suppliers and labor suppliers to the
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subcontractors of the principal contractor are entitled to
recovery based upon the bond statute; the recovery is not based
upon a contract between the parties.
In a recent case where a concrete supplier on a public
contract brought an action under the Miller Act, the court held
that "one cannot recover damages for breach of contract on a
bond required by the act."

Mobile Premix Concrete, Inc. v.

Santa Fe Engineers, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 512, 516 (D. Colo. 1981).
In L. P. Friestedt Co. v. United States Fireproofing Co.,
125 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 1942), the plaintiffs-subcontractors
had suffered increased costs for labor and material because of
the general contractor's delay.

The plaintiffs' complaint

alleged that the prime contractor had breached its contract by
the delay and thereby caused plaintiffs' damages.

The court

addressed plaintiffs' breach of contract issue and denied the
plaintiffs' recovery.
A claimant cannot recover damages for breach of contract on
a bond that is required by statute.

The reasoning behind this

rule is aptly explained in Gutman v. P. J. Carling Co., 254 F.
Supp. 1001, 1002 (D.N.Y. 1965) (emphasis in original):
The bond furnished by them [the surety]
is conditioned . . . for the payment of
any sums due a subcontractor . . . for
labor performed or materials furnished.
The purpose and intent of the Miller Act
is to protect subcontractors engaged in federal construction projects
against defaults in payment for labor
or materials furnished by them, but not
more . . . .
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The District Court correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that a
breach of contract unrelated to the work is not covered under a
statutory payment bond.

This Court should affirm that ruling.

IV. Even if This Court Declines to Affirm the Trial
Courtfs Ruling that a Surety is not Liable for a
Principal's Negligence, as a Matter of Law Transport
Still Cannot Recover Damages for Repairs
The issue in this case is not, as Transport urges, whether
a surety is liable for repairs made to a lessor's machinery.
That is only half of the issue.

The complete issue is whether a

surety is liable for repairs caused by the principal's
negligence.
This complete issue is easily misconstrued because it
comprises two areas of inquiry.

The first inquiry is whether a

surety is liable for repairs made to a lessor's equipment.

The

short answer to this inquiry is that it depends upon the type of
repair.

The second inquiry—which Transport overlooks—is the

extent of the surety's liability.

A statutory payment bond

surety does not have unlimited liability.

Law and reason have

answered that a surety's liability does not extend to damages
caused by the principal's negligence.

All of the repairs for

which Transport seeks recovery were caused, Transport claims, by
the negligence of the contractor.

Those kinds of repairs—by

law—are not recoverable.
Transport disregards the inquiry into the surety's extent
of liability and assert that the "extensive," "extraordinary"
and "negligent" damages "went into and became part of the
project."

Brief of Appellants at p. 12. Even if this Court

were to disregard the law which cuts off a surety's liability
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for a principal's negligence as a matter of law, Transport still
cannot recover for its repairs as a matter of law.
Transport relies on J. F. Tolton Investment Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 293 P. 611 (Utah 1930), in support of its position
that the extraordinary damages to its trucks went into and
became a part of the project.

The Tolton facts are quite

different from the facts of the case now before this Court.
example, in Tolton, no damages were caused by negligence.

For

The

materials claimed consisted of small bolts, nuts, hoses, valves
and belts totaling $221.01 (Id. at 614), not entire belly-dump
trailers.

In fact, the holding of the Tolton case is more

favorable to Reliance:
Hence it is held that minor and inexpensive repairs which do not in any
true sense add to the value of the
equipment, but which are incidental
to the use of machinery, are within
the obligation of such bonds.
Id. (citations omitted).
In other words, major and expensive repairs which add to
the value of the equipment and which are crucial to the use of
the machinery are not within the obligation of such bonds.

In

allowing nuts and bolts to come under the payment bond, the
Tolton Court carefully limited its decision (perhaps to avoid
future abuse) by stating, "this does not include liability for .
. . materials furnished which from their nature and use will not
be consumed in the work."

Tolton, 293 p. 612.

Whether repairs (not repairs caused by the principal's
negligence) are allowed under a payment bond usually depends
upon the extent of the repair.

Continental Casualty Co. v.
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Clarence L. Boyd Co,, 140 F.2d 115, 116 (10th Cir. 1944)
("Repair parts, appliances, and assessories which add materially
to the value of the equipment and render it available for other
work are not within the coverage of the payment bond provided
for [by the statute]."); Roig v. Castro, 71 F. Supp. 36 (D.P.R.
1947).

One court ruled that equipment "which would not be

expected to be substantially consumed during the construction
project" is not a proper claim.

Ibex Industries, Inc. v. Coast

Line Waterproofing, 563 F. Supp. 1142, 1146 (D.D.C. 1983).
Other courts have determined that "[t]he surety may not be
liable for repairs made to equipment after completion of the
work."

Miller & Bentley Equipment Co. v. Kelly, 192 F. Supp.

274, 275 (D. Alaska 1961).

Some courts have stated that repairs

or improvements which survive completion of the project are not
within the terms of the bond.

United States Fidelity &

Guarentee v. Cagg, 75 P.2d 412, 414 (Okl. 1938).

Still other

courts deny recovery on the bond where the repairs make the
equipment available to work not only on the bonded project, but
also available for other work.
942 (Minn. 1929).

Clifton v. Nordeny 226 N.W. 940,

The repairs claimed by Transport are major,

they were not of the kind which are expected to be consumed,
they were made after the project's completion and were available
for other work.

Accordingly, even disregarding the extent of

liability issue, this Court should still find that the repairs
are not a proper bond claim.
Of particular help in deciding when repairs come under a
statutory payment bond is the explanation given in A. L. Young
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Machinery Co, v. Cupps, 2 P.2d 321, 323 (Cal. 1931) (quoting
Dennis v. Enke, 224 N.W. 925):
In order to create liability on the
part of the surety for the purchase price
of tools and appliances under these contract bonds, at least the following elements we think must be present: First,
the tool or appliance must be purchased
specifically and particularly for use in
the performance of the particular contract;
second, the use of such tool or appliance
must be at least proper, if not reasonably
necessary, in connection with and about the
carrying out of the contract; third, the tool
or appliance must be used in or about the
performance of the contract; fourth, the
tool or appliance must be such that it
is reasonably to be expected in the
natural course of events that its normal
life for the purpose for which it was
designed will be practically consumed
by its use in and about the performance
of the contract, and in this connection
the facts of each particular case must
be taken into consideration.
Transport's belly-dump trailers are not minor "tools or
appliances."

The major repairs to Transport's trucks occurred

after completion of the project.
survived the project.

Repairs were extensive and

The repairs qualify as capital

improvement, not as "incidental" repairs.

The trucks were not

"specifically and particularly" purchased for use in the
project, and it cannot be said that the parties reasonably
expected that in the normal course of events the trucks would be
consumed in the project.

As a matter of law, Transport's claims

for repairs fail to qualify on all factors.
Although statutory payment bonds are remedial in nature,
they also contain defined limits.

In carrying out the statute's

purpose "unjust and absurd consequences are, if possible, to be
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avoided and courts are not justified in writing liability into
[these bonds]."

Gray Bar Electric Co, v. John A. Volpe

Construction Co., 387 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1967).
Reliance concedes that "minor and inexpensive repairs which
do not in any true sense add to the value of the equipment"
(Tolton, 293 P.2d at 614) may be covered by the payment bond.
However, Transport expressly contracted through its lease
agreement that it would "provide maintenance" for any such
incidental repairs.

Addendum "F," paragraph 2.

Likewise, as a matter of law, Reliance is not liable for
what Transport characterizes as "extraordinary" and "excessive"
damages caused by the principal—particularly when Transport's
repairs were made after completion of the project and were
available for use on other projects.

The repairs were either

assumed by contract by Transport or they are beyond the scope of
"incidental" repairs which are required by law to come under the
payment bond.

Therefore, even disregarding the extent of

liability issue, Reliance is still not liable for Transport's
claimed repairs as a matter of law.
V.

Reliance is Entitled to Escrow Funds Where the
Funds are Contract Payments and Reliance Has
Paid More Than One Million Dollars in Bond Claims
A. Reliance is Entitled to the Escrow Funds
Based upon Subrogation

The District Court's Final Order and Judgment ordered that
Reliance is entitled to all of the funds in the escrow account
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based upon its rights of subrogation to the contract proceeds.
Addendum "B".
Reliance's right to the escrow funds is grounded in over a
century of cases that establish a surety's interest in contract
payments.

At the head of these cases is Pearlman v. Reliance

Insurance Company, 371 U.S. 132, 83 S. Ct. 232, 9 L. Ed. 2d 190
(1962).

In Pearlman, Reliance, as surety, had issued a

performance bond and a payment bond for a contractor on a
federal government construction project.

These bonds were

furnished by Reliance pursuant to the federal Miller Act, upon
which Utah's payment bond statute, which is involved in this
case, is patterned.

The contractor had financial trouble and

was unable to complete the project.

Reliance was compelled to

pay nearly $350,000 to discharge the debts of the contractor for
labor and materials.

The government held over $87,000 in

retention, and turned that fund over to the contractor's trustee
in bankruptcy.

The trustee asserted that the retention funds

vested in him.

Reliance filed a petition alleging that the fund

4. Transport argued in the District Court that Reliance could
not be subrogated to the funds in the escrow account because
Reliance had not paid Transport's claim. See Memorandum in
Opposition to Reliance's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Section II in No. C85-8421. Reliance proposed to pay
Transport's rental hours claim in one of two way. Reliance
could pay Transport from Reliance's own funds, whereupon it
would be entitled to the contract funds in the escrow account
under subrogation. Or, Reliance could, by the principle of
exoneration, require the contract funds in the escrow account to
be paid in satisfaction of Transport's claim, whereupon Reliance
would be entitled to the balance in the escrow account by
subrogation. Transcript of Proceedings on Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, held July 10, 1987 (R. at 704, pp.2-5), at
2-5, attached and marked as Addendum "M." Under either
proposal, the result would be the same.
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never vested in the trustee and that Reliance was the owner of
the fund "free and clear" of the claims of the trustee or any
other person.
The Supreme court held for Reliance.

In doing so it relied

on two prior Supreme Court decisions holding that there is a
security interest in a withheld fund to which the surety is
subrogated.

Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227,

17 S. Ct. 142, 41 L. Ed. 412 (1896), and Henningsen v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 208 U.S. 404, 28 S. Ct. 389, 52
L. Ed. 547 (1908).

The court concluded:

We therefore hold in accord with the
established legal principles stated
above that the Government had a right
to use the retained fund to pay laborers and materialmen; that the laborers
and materialmen had a right to be paid
out of the fund; that the contractor,
had he completed his job and paid his
laborers and materialmen, would have
become entitled to the fund; and that
the surety, having paid the laborers
and materialmen, is entitled to the
benefit of all these rights to the
extent necessary to reimburse it.
Consequently, since the surety in
this case has paid out more than the
amount of the existing fund, it has
a right to all of it.
371 U.S. at 141-142 (emphasis added).
It does not matter that the District Court did not specify
to whose rights Reliance became subrogated, because Reliance
became subrogated to all these rights.

Since Reliance has paid

out more than the amount in the escrow account, Reliance has a
right to all of it.
Contract funds are impressed with an equity in favor of a
paying surety.

In Prairie State Bank, supra, the bank took an
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assignment of the retainage fund in consideration of advances
made by the bank to the contractor.

With regard to that

assignment, the court stated:
Sundberg & Company [the contractor]
could not transfer to the bank any
greater rights in the fund than they
themselves possessed. Their rights
were subordinate to those of the
United States and the sureties . . .
[I]t necessarily results that the
equity, if any, acquired by the
Prairie Bank in the ten percent
fund then in existence and thereafter to arise was subordinate to
the equity which had . . . arisen
in favor of the surety . . . .
17 S. Ct. at 147.
The escrow fund is derived from payments made by the State
by joint check to L. A. Young and Transport.

But that payment

could convey no greater rights than the State or L. A. Young
then had.

That payment was impressed with the subrogation right

of Reliance, which equitable lien is superior to the right of
Transport.
bond.

Reliance's right dates back to the execution of the

Salt Lake City v. O'Connor, 68 Utah 233, 249 P. 810, 817

(1926).
Reliance's equitable right was not extinguished by the
State's payment to L. A. Young and Transport.

The escrow

account is a distinct and clearly identifiable fund.

It is not

like the payments that Transport had already received, which
have been dissipated.

The contract proceeds progressed no

farther than the escrow account.

Reliance's right of
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subrogation attaches to contract payments that can be identified
and followed.
The cases cited by Transport in support of its argument for
the escrow funds are distinguishable on the case's facts. For
example, in National Surety Co. v. Salt Lake County, 5 F.2d 34
(8th Cir. 1925), only one creditor was involved.

The National

Surety case did not address a situation, such as the one in the
the present case, involving multiple claimants.

Neither do the

cases cited by Transport support Transport's agrument that a
surety's right of subrogation must be postponed until claims
outside the class of claims covered by the bond are satisfied.
The District Court ruled in this case that Transport's claim for
damages to its equipment was outside the coverage of the bond.
Moreover, the claim is disputed and unliquidated.

Reliance need

not wait for reimbursement until that claim is paid.
Authorities relied upon by Transport regarding resort to
security are not applicable to this case.
not Transport's security.

The escrow money is

The money was merely placed in escrow

pending the resolution of the rental dispute which was
subsequently resolved by stipulation.

Transport could not

obtain the money without a joint order by Transport and L. A.
Young or an order by a court.
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. West Georgia National Bank, 387
F. Supp. 1090 (1974); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Sweeney, 80 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1935).
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Further distinguishing the cases cited by Transport is the
fact that in the present case Reliance fully performed its
obligations under the performance bond.

The fact that

respondent paid the debts and fulfilled the duties of L. A,
Young entitled Reliance to retainages as the subrogee of the
State•

Covenant Mutual Insurance Co. v. Able Concrete Pump,

609 F. Supp. 27 (D. Cal. 1984).

In Covenant Mutual, the court

held that a surety who had completed performance pursuant to its
performance bond, at a cost greater than the balance owing under
the contract, was a subrogee of the government and had an
equitable right to the government's retainages from the
contractor's progress payment.

The court concluded that the

surety was entitled to these funds even though the payment bond
did not fully compensate laborers and material suppliers. The
court held that since the surety had completed performance at a
cost in excess of the contract price, including retainages, the
surety was entitled to all of the retained sums.
In this case, Reliance completed the project at a cost in
excess of the contract price and, in fact, has expended over
$1.2 million.

Reliance is therefore entitled to progress

payments and the funds held in escrow which are identifiable as
progress payments.
B.

Exoneration and Quia Timet Entitle Reliance to Apply
the Escrow Funds to Transport's Claims

Reliance's complaint (C87-1984) also sought relief through
exoneration and quia timet.

Exoneration, in the context of a

bonded construction project, is the surety's right to require
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that contract proceeds be used to pay contract obligations of
its principal, which if unpaid, would become the obligation of
the surety.

For exoneration to operate, the surety need not

make payment.
This well established principle of suretyship entitles
Reliance to require the escrow funds to be used to pay the
bonded obligations of Reliance, and not to be diverted for any
other purpose.

One court has explained this principle as

follows:
No principle of equity is more familiar,
or more firmly established, than that a
surety, after the debt for which he is
liable has become due, without paying,
or being called on to pay it, may file
a bill in equity to compel the principal
debtor to exonerate him from liability
by its payment, provided no rights of the
creditor are prejudiced thereby.
Poster v. Continental Casualty Co., 105 So. 2d 83, 85-86 (Ala.
1958).
The United States Supreme Court has applied exoneration in
a construction context.

In Martin v. National Surety Co., 300

U.S. 588 (1937), the contractor gave a subcontractor a power of
attorney by which the subcontractor obtained from the government
progress or deferred payments then due upon the contract.

When

the contractor's surety learned of the subcontractor's actions,
it brought suit in federal court against the contractor and the
subcontractor and prayed that the monies received by the
subcontractor be impounded and that the funds be disbursed in
payment of bills for labor and material in exoneration of the
surety.
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The Supreme Court stated that the equities in favor of
material suppliers, growing out of an indemnity agreement
between the contractor and the surety and the assignment of
contract proceeds in that agreement, were impressed upon monies
collected by the subcontractor.

The Supreme Court further noted

that it was in the interest of the government to give effect to
the assignment by the contractor to the surety.

The Court

explained:
The proceeds of the contract, when
collected by the subcontractor under his
power of attorney, were received by him
with the knowledge of the agreement between the contractor and the surety whereby such proceeds became a fund to be devoted in the first instance to the payment of material suppliers and others
similarly situated.
Martin, 300 U.S. at 593.
L. A. Young and Reliance have executed an indemnity
agreement whereby L. A. Young assigned contract proceeds to
Reliance.

See Addendum

ff

J.,f

Transport has been notified

through these proceedings of that assignment.

The escrow funds

are therefore impressed with an equity for the payment of
obligations covered by Reliance's bond.
Transport also knew that the source of the money deposited
in the escrow fund was contract payments on the Black Rock
project.

It is a well established rule, followed in Utah, that

if a creditor knows that the source of the money he receives is
the contract upon which a surety is liable, the creditor cannot
apply the money otherwise than in relief of the surety.

Geneva

Pipe Company v. S & H Insurance Compan/, 714 P.2d 648 (1986);
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Salt Lake City v. OyConnor, supra; Simpson, Suretyship 192
(1950).

Reliance therefore has the right to require Transport

and L. A. Young to apply the funds in the escrow account to the
payment of Reliance's bonded obligation.
Courts have also recognized the principle of quia timet.
Quia timet is the surety's right to relief when it justifiably
fears that the contract proceeds may be diverted from contract
obligations.

Whereas a surety's right of exoneration arises

when its liability is absolute, its right to quia timet relief
g
arises when the liability is merely anticipated.
In Morley Construction Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 90
F.2d 976 (8th Cir. 1937), the court of appeals affirmed a trial
court decree granting the surety's suit for quia timet.

The

surety had executed a bond in favor of a contractor for a
construction contract between the contractor and the United
States.

Pursuant to an agreement between the surety and the

contractor, the contractor was to deposit into a joint account
monies and estimates received from the United States from the
construction contract.

The contractor then experienced

financial difficulties.

The surety sued to compel the

application of contract installment payments to claims for labor
and materials going into the project.

The surety alleged that

unless the funds were impressed with a trust or lien and the
contractor was restrained from withdrawing or disbursing the
See
and Other
Jennings,
Forum 685

generally, Babcock, "An Update—Suits for Exoneration
Special Relief," 17 Forum 344 (1981); Mann and
"Quia Timet: A Remedy for the Fearful Surety," 20
(1985).
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contract payments that had been paid to it, the surety would
suffer irreparable loss.

The court granted the surety relief.

Another court, in granting exoneration, explained:
As between the surety and the principal
there arises without payment by the surety
and without his having even been sued an
equity of exoneration. To have subrogation
a surety must have discharged in full the
obligation for which he is bound, . . .
. . . In the case of exoneration he proceeds
before payment quia timet, and seeks to
have payment made to the creditor. . .
Assuredly equity will require to be applied
to the obligation a fund which by the very
contract of suretyship stands as security
for performance.
Glades County v. Detroit Fidelity and Surety Co., 57 F.2d 449,
451-452 (5th Cir. 1932) (emphasis added).
In this case, Transport seeks to use the contract proceeds
in the escrow account to pay its claim for damage to its
equipment.

The District Court has ruled that that claim is not

a proper bond claim.

The District Court's ruling regarding the

escrow account prevents diversion of those contract proceeds to
unbonded obligations and correctly applies them to the proper
bond claim for rental hours.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of law, a surety is not--and should not b e —
liable on a statutory payment bond for a principal's negligence.
The applicable statute is specific and limits recovery only to
materials supplied for "performance of the work provided for in
the contract."

"Negligent" and "extraordinary" damages are not

"work provided for in the contract."

Case law, analogy to

mechanics' lien law and sound public policy all support the
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Court in affirming that a surety is not liable for the
negligence or breach of contract of the principal.

A surety is

not a liability, casualty or property insurer; to hold otherwise
would misconstrue a surety's function and expand its liability
to the detriment of the construction industry.

Even if this

Court refuses to rule that a principal is not liable for a
principal's negligence, as a matter of law, Transport still
cannot recover damages for repairs.
Furthermore, Reliance is entitled to the escrow funds under
the principles of subrogation, exoneration, and quia timet.
The District Court amply examined the facts material to its
final orders and judgments.
of this case are in disout'**

No facts material to the resolution
The District Court properly

decided the determinate./e issues as a matter of law and set
forth those properly decided issues in its final order and
judgment.

Under the proper standard of review the final order

and judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of March, 1988.
Howell, Fetzer & Hughes

^J^A^M.

Paul R. Howell
Attorneys for Respondent
Reliance Insurance Company
psh3-l
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ADDENDUM "A"

Salt Lake County, w

MMU8 1987
Paul R. Howell
(USB 1556)
Clark B. Fetzer (USB 1069)
^nd^C^K 3rd Oist. Court
David L. Hughes (USB 4744)
HOWELL, FETZER & HUGHES
By
Attorneys for Defendant Reliance Insurance Co
200 South Main St. Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-1503
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY
a Montana partnership, and
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a Montana
corporation, qualified to do
business in the State of Utah,
Plaintiff and
Counterdefendants,

ORDER GRANTING
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF DEFENDANT
RELIANCE INSURANCE
COMPANY

vs.
L.A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
and RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,

Civil No. C85-8421
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants and
Counterclaimants.
Defendant Reliance Insurance Company's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment came on for hearing on December 19,
1987, at 10:00 a.m.

David L. Hughes and Paul R. Howell

appeared as counsel for defendant Reliance Insurance
Company, in support of the motion, and Calvin L. Rampton and
Larry A. Steele appeared as counsel for plaintiffs, in
opposition thereto.

The court heard the arguments of

000££

counsel and has reviewed the file.

The court having taken

defendant Reliance Insurance Companyfs motion for partial
summary judgment under advisement and being fully advised,
now orders as follows:
1.

Reliance Insurance Company's motion is granted.

2.

The payment bond does not cover damage to

equipment caused by any negligence or misuse by L.A. Young
Sons Construction Company, and Reliance Insurance Company is
not liable therefor.
3.

The payment bond does not cover damage caused by

any breach of the contract between plaintiffs and L.A. Young
Sons Construction Company, and Reliance Insurance Company is
not liable therefor^7p
DATED this-i3th day of March, 1987.
BY THE

ATTEST

COURT:

Honorable Frank G. poel
Third District Court Judge

H. DIXON HINDLEY
Cferfc
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ADDENDUM "B"

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt I fl^ P^'infM ( Ifqft

SEP 14 1987
H. «S&on ^ N l e y ^ W t B ) • / C o , , r , '

Calvin L. Rampton (USB #2682)
Larry A. Steele (USB //3090)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff Transystems, Inc.
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY,
a Montana partnership, and
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a
Montana corporation qualified
to do business in the State
of Utah,

FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs
L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
and RELIANCE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation,

Civil No. 85-8421
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY,
a Montana partnership, and
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a Montana

Civil No. C87-1984
Judge Frank G. Noel

corporation qualified to do
business in the State of
Utah; L. A, YOUNG SONS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Defendants.

Reliance Insurance Company ("Reliance") filed a motion
for partial summary judgment dated May 12, 1987. Plaintiffs
filed a motion for summary judgment dated August 13, 1987. The
pre-trial conference was held August 31, 1987 at 8:00 a.m.

In

attendance at the pre-trial conference were David L. Hughes and
Paul R. Howell representing Reliance.

Calvin L. Rampton and

Larry A. Steele appeared as counsel for plaintiffs and John
Preston Creer appeared as counsel for L. A. Young Sons
Construction Company.
The court previously having heard the arguments of
counsel concerning Reliance's motion and plaintiff's motion,
and having reviewed the file, the court hereby FINDS and ORDERS:
1.
granted.

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is

The amount of plaintiff's judgment is $53,423.37,

plus prejudgment interest in the amount of $7,183.84. The
amount of prejudgment interest is based upon the interest
generated by the sum of $53,423.37 held in the escrow account
through the date of August 31, 1987. Post judgment interest is
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limited to the amount of interest generated by the sum of
$60,607.21 plus interest as compounded by the escrow and as
long as funds are held in the escrow account.
2.
granted.

Reliance's motion for partial summary judgment is

Reliance is entitled to all of the funds in the

escrow account based upon its rights of subrogation to contract
proceeds.
3.

The funds are to remain in escrow pending further

order of the court.
4.

Attorney for L. A. Young represented that because

of amounts owed to Plaintiffs for rent or other sums owed to
Reliance and because L. A. Young is in a process of
liquidation, L. A. Young had no practical interest in appearing
and defending at the scheduled trial.

L. A. Young acknowledged

that no matter which party prevailed, Reliance or Plaintiffs
would be entitled to any funds obtained.

All issues between

plaintiffs and Reliance have been decided by summary judgment.
Counsel for Reliance further indicated that Reliance is not
obligated to and will not defend L.A. Young.

Plaintiffs

represented that there was no practical reason for Plaintiffs
to try the case unless and until the court's prior rulings are
reversed on appeal.

Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure, this court finds that although all prior
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orders and judgments do not resolve all legal claims of all
parties in this litigation, there is no practical or just
reason for delay in entering all orders and judgments as
final.

Accordingly, this order and all prior orders are

expressly entered as final and appealable.
5.

A stay of execution of judgment is in place as to

plaintiff's judgment against Reliance and also upon Reliance's
judgment on the escrow funds until further order of the court.
6.

The trial setting which is scheduled for

September 21, 1987 through October 2, 1987 is vacated pending
further request for trial setting.
DATED this

/*r

day of September, 1987.

[onorable Frank G.
0. Noel
Honorable
District Court Judge

By

; K

S> \

'

^m^i^^^^^^
D.p»Jiy

Approved as to form:
xl—

Da
^

Date: C y / m ^

V/W?

7

-4>afid L. Hughes
T/
Attorneys for Reliance Insurance
Company

fl/rtClui

_%

^jyUf'A

L^ry A./S te"ele
torn^ys for Transport Leasing
Company

-4-

Date:
Johxif Presuuu-- K^LW/L

Attorneys for L. /A. Young So ns
Construction Company

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

7<

I hereby certify that on this the ^ZlZZTctay of
September, 1987, I caused to be hand-delivered, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Final Order and Judgment, to the
following parties of record:
Paul R. Howell
Clark B. Fetzer
David L. Hughes
Howell, Fetzer & Hughes
700 Continental Bank Building
200 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
John Preston Creer
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utai^n84111

5572s
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ADDENDUM "C"

Utah Code Ann.
63-56-38.

63-56-38.

(Supp 1986)

Bonds necessary when contract is awarded.

(1) When a construction contract is awarded, the
following bonds or security shall be delivered to the state
and shall become binding on the parties upon the execution
of the contract:
(a) a performance bond satisfactory to the state,
in an amount equal to 100% of the price specified
in the contract, executed by a surety company
authorized to do business in this state or any
other form satisfactory to the state; and
(b) a payment bond satisfactory to the state, in
an amount equal to 100% of the price specified in
the contract, executed by a surety company
authorized to do business in this state or any
other form satisfactory to the state, for the
protection of all persons supplying labor and
material to the contractor or its subcontractors
for the performance of the work provided for in
the contract.
(2) Rules may provide for waiver of the requirement of
a performance or payment bond where a bond is deemed
unnecessary for the protection of the state.
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to
the contractor or subcontractor for the work provided in the
contract, in respect of which a payment bond is furnished
under this section, who has not been paid in full within 90
days from the date on which the last of the labor was
performed or material was supplied by the person for whom
the claim is made, may sue on the payment bond for any
amount unpaid at the time the suit is instituted and may
prosecute the action for the amount due the person. Any
person having a contract with a subcontractor of the
contractor, but no express or implied contract with the
contractor furnishing the payment bond, has a right of
action upon the payment bond upon giving written notice to
the contractor and surety company within 90 days from the
date on which the last of the labor was performed or
material was supplied by the person for whom the claim is
made. The person shall state in the notice the amount
claimed and the name of the party for whom the labor was
performed or to whom the material was supplied. The notice
shall be served by registered or certified mail, postage

prepaid, on the contractor and surety company at any place
the contractor or surety company maintains an office or
conducts business.
(4) Any suit instituted upon a payment bond shall be
brought in the district court of the county in which the
construction contract was to be performed. No suit may be
commenced by a claimant under this section more than 180
days after a surety finally denies that claimant's claim.
The obligee named in the bond need not be joined as a party
in the suit.
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ADDENDUM "D"

0°^

Ik 13 .inures

Calvin L. Rampton/ USB # 2682
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY/
a Montana partnership/ and
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a Montana
corporation qualified to do
business in the State of Utah/

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs/
vs.
Ctivil No

C 858421

L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY/ a Utah corporation/
and RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY/
a corporation/
Defendants.

COME NOW the Plaintiffs above named and for cause of
action against the above-named Defendants complain and allege
as follows:
1.

The

Plaintiff

Transystems,

Inc.

is a Montana

corporation with its principal place of business at Helena,
Montana,

and

Utah.

The

is

qualified

Plaintiff

to do business

Transport

Leasing

in the State of
is

a

Montana

oooco'

partnership doing business in the State of Utah-

Both of the

Plaintiffs are the owners of various types of heavy transport
vehicles

and

are

engaged

in the business

of leasing

said

vehicles and also in the business of hauling commodities and
materials of various kinds.
2.
corporation
Richfield/

L. A. Young Sons Construction Company is a Utah
having
Utah/

its
and

principal
is

place

engaged

in

of
the

business

in

business

of

contracting for the construction of roads.
3.

The Defendant

Reliance

Insurance

Company

is a

bonding and insurance company qualified to do business in the
State of Utah and doing business in the State of Utah writing
and issuing construction bonds.
4.
Plaintiffs

On

or

about

entered

into

the
a

24th

day

leasing

of

May, 1985/

agreement

with

the
the

Defendant L. A. Young Sons Construction Company/ a copy of
which agreement is marked Exhibit "A",
by

attached hereto/ and

this reference made a part hereof.

Under the terms of

such agreement/ the services to be performed thereunder were
to be performed

in Salt Lake County/

State of Utah.

This

court is the proper venue in which to bring this action.
5.
parties

to

On

or about

Exhibit

"A"

the

21st day

entered

into

of June, 1985, the
an

addendum

to

such

agreement, a copy of which addendum is marked Exhibit "B" and
hereto attached and by this reference made a part hereof.
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called

6.

Plaintiffs made

for

in

Exhibits

construction site.

the

"A"

tractor

and

"B"

and

trailer

available

units

on

the

Part of the vehicles were made available

on May 28/ 1985/ and the balance of said vehicles was made
available
Exhibits

shortly
"A"

thereafter/

and

all within the provisions of

"B" attached

hereto.

Such

tractor

and

trailer units remained continuously on the job and available
to the Defendant L. A. Young Sons Construction Company at all
times to and including September 6/ 1985.
7.

During

the

course

of

the

performance

of

the

leasing agreement/ disputes arose between the parties/ both
as to the number of hours of tractor and trailer time for
which the Defendant L. A. Young Sons Construction should be
billed and as to the amount of repairs to such tractor and
trailer

units

intentional
Company

and

Construction
parties

to

which

were

wrongdoing
thus

the

Company.
the

effect

of

caused
L.

A.

by

the

Young

responsibility

negligence

Sons

or

Construction

of L. A. Young

Sons

An agreement was reached between the
that undisputed amounts of billings

made by Plaintiffs to L. A. Young Sons Construction Company
should be paid to the Plaintiffs and that disputed amounts
should be paid into an escrow account at the Continental Bank
& Trust Company in Salt Lake City/ Utah.
Exhibit
letter

Attached hereto as

"C" and by this reference made a part hereof is a
agreement

dated

August

-3-

13/

1985/

regarding

the

establishment
Exhibit
escrow
executed

of

the

escrow

account.

Attached

hereto as

"D" and by this reference made a part hereof is the
agreement
by

with

Continental

Bank

&

Trust

Company

the parties hereto and approved by Continental

Bank & Trust Company.
8.

The

Continental
account

Bank

less

accumulated

amount

including

of

Such

the

escrow

payments

30/

will

1985/

continue

account

made

disbursements

November
amount

in

all

authorized

as

$61/214.13.

net

into

plus
was

at
such

earnings

approximately

to accrue

earnings

until disbursed by the Bank pursuant to the agreement of the
parties or the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
9.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Exhibit "CM and

in breach of such provisions/ the Defendant L. A. Young Sons
Construction Company has refused

to place in escrow certain

amounts arising

from disputed billings from the Plaintiffs/

and

therefore

there

Plaintiffs

are
by

amounts

the Defendants

over

due
and

and

owing

to

the

above the amount in

such escrow accounts.
10.

Under the provisions of Paragraph 4 of Exhibit

"A"/ the Defendants are required to maintain the roads over
which the leased vehicles are to be operated

in a suitable

condition so that unreasonable or excessive wear and tear to
the leased units shall not ensue.
Defendants

are

further

charged

-4-

Under said paragraph the

with

the responsibility

of

repairing

any damage to the leased vehicles resulting from

negligence

of

the

Lessee

Defendant

L. A. Young

keep

roadways

the

suitable

or

Sons Construction

over which

condition

Lessee's

to avoid

employees.
Company

the equipment

The

failed

operated

to

in a

unreasonable or excessive wear

and tear to the leased units and also through the negligence
of

the

Company

employees

of

said

L.

A.

Young

Sons

Construction

or through the wilful misconduct of said employees

inflicted

damages

$149/855.61-

on

said

leased

units

Such damage

resulted

provisions of Paragraph 4,

Exhibit

from

in

the

amount

of

the breach of the

"A"/ and the Plaintiffs

are entitled to be paid such amount and have submitted to the
Defendants
amount

has

itemized
been

billings

paid

into

thereon.
escrow

A
and

portion of such
the

balance/

in

violation of the provisions of Exhibit "C"/ has not been paid
either to the Plaintiffs or into escrow.
11.

Paragraph 5(b) of Exhibit "A" provides for the

amounts to be paid by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs for
the lease of tractor and trailer units.

The Defendants have

paid a portion of the billings made under Paragraph 5(b) of
Exhibit
escrow

"A"/ and
and

have

have paid
refused

some of

to

pay

the billings

other billings at all in

violation of the provisions of Exhibit "C".
from

into the

and owing

to the Plaintiffs

provisions

of Paragraph 5(b) of Exhibit

The amount due

the Defendants under the
"A" is $53/276.00.

ooooo1
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Full

and

complete

accountings

of

such

amounts

have

been

furnished by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants.
12.
executed

The

a bond

guaranteeing

Defendant

running

the

Insurance

Company

to the owners of the road project

payment

claims of subcontracters/
under such contract.

Reliance

by

the

contractor

material

of

suppliers/

all

and

valid

laborers

The claims of the Plaintiffs hereto is

within the guarantee of such bond.

Such bondsman is indebted

to the Plaintiffs for the amount of the claims against L. A.
Young Sons

Construction Company.

13.
above

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the claims

described

from

the

time

the

same

evidenced by various billings until paid.
wilful

failure

of

the

claims, the Plaintiff

Defendant

to

is entitled

make

became

due

as

As a result of the
payment

to recover

of

said

a reasonable

attorneys1 fee for bringing this action.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray judgment against the
Defendants as follows:
(a)
and owing

by

For the sum of $203,131.61, amounts justly due
the Defendants

to the Plaintiffs for amounts

payable under the provisions of Exhibit "A" plus interest on
such

amount

at

the

legal

rate

from

the dates of

various

billings until paid.
(b)

For a reasonable attorneys1

the Plaintiffs1

fee to be paid to

attorney and for other allowable costs and

ooooo
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expenses incurred in the bringing of this action.
(c)

Directing

and

authorizing

Continental

Bank &

Trust Company to pay to the Plaintiffs the amounts contained
in

the

together

escrow
with

account
all

described

interest

accrued

in

Paragraph

5

above/

in such account to the

date of such payment/ such payment to apply on the judgment
awarded under (a) and (b) above.
DATED this

[3—'day

of December/ 1985.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By

CSTvin L. Ramptb
A t t o r n e y s for Pi

000C08
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EXHIBIT "A"

LEASING AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into this C>^A
May, 1985, by and between
Company,

a

"Lessee"),

Utah
and

L. A. Young

corporation
Transport

(hereinafter

Leasing

partnership, and Transystems,

Sons

Company,

Inc., a Montana

day of

Construction
called
a

the

Montana

Corporation

qualified to do business in the state of Utah, (hereinafter
called the "Lessor").
W I T N E S S T H
WHEREAS, the Lessee has entered into a contract with
the Department

of Transportation of the State of Utah to

perform certain construction work on a road project in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, designated as the Black Rock to
Old Saltaire Road, No. IR-80-3 (95) 102, and
WHEREAS, the Lessee desires to lease from the Lessor
certain equipment as hereinafter described for the purpose of
performing such contract, and
WHEREAS, the Lessee is indebted to the Lessor on two
prior

contracts

designated

as

the

Burmester

Interchange

Project and the Millard County Road Project in the sum of
$132,277.79, a portion of which has been reduced to judgment
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, in a case designated as C84-7447, and

WHEREAS, Reliance Insurance Company, a corporation
qualified to do business in the State of Utah (hereinafter
called the "Bonding Company") executed the bond covering the
Burmester Project and the Millard County Road Project and is
also issuing a bond to the State of Utah covering the Black
Rock to Old Saltaire Road contract; and
WHEREAS, the Bonding Company, in consideration of
the agreements hereinafter entered into by the Lessor, has
furnished

the Lessor with

a separate

letter agreement by

which the Bonding Company agrees that the provisions of this
contract will in no way affect the liability of the Bonding
Company

in regard to the Burmester Interchange Project and

the Millard County Road Project,
NOW,

THEREFORE,

in

consideration

of

the

mutual

agreements hereinafter set forth, it is agreed between the
parties as follows:
1.

The Lessor shall lease to the Lessee and the

Lessee shall lease from the Lessor for use in the performance
of the contract with the Utah Department of Transportation
mentioned above eight (8) tractor and trailer units for the
handling and hauling of sand, gravel, fill material and other
similar substances, each unit to have a capacity of 50 tons.
The lease shall be for a period of at least 60 working days,
to commence on the
2.

£7<c5 day of 7 / / & ^ 3 f ^ ^

t 1985.

The Lessor shall furnish the said equipment in
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in good condition and during
provide

maintenance,

licensing,

the terms of the lease will

except

insurance,

as

permits,

hereinafter

and

shall

provided,

provide,

in

addition, two full time supervisors to supervise the Lessor's
obligations under the lease.
3.
and

fuel

The Lessee shall furnish and pay for all fuel

taxes, all

labor, including

all

tax and

fringe

benefits, and all services required in the loading, weighing,
and unloading of such trucks.
4.
be

damaged

In the event any of the leased equipment shall
through

the

negligence

of

the Lessee

or the

Lessee's employees, the Lessee shall be responsible for the
repair

of

such

damage.

The

Lessee

shall

have

the

responsibility of maintaining the roads over which the leased
equipment will be operated in a suitable condition so that
unreasonable or excessive wear and tear to the leased units
shall not result from the operation.
5.

Payment shall be made from the Lessee to the

Lessor as follows:
a.

$41,250 as a mobilization charge which shall be
payable out of the first payment made by the
Department

of Transportation

of

the State of

Utah on estimated work performed.
b.

Payments

for

the

lease of

the equipment, in

addition to the mobilization charge set forth

.3.

ooo

above,
unit

shall

for

minimum

be $35 per hour for each hauling

a
of

minimum
60

of

working

16

hours

days.

If

a day

for a

the

average

usage of all eight units shall exceed 18 hours
per day in any one day, all hours over 18 hours
per day shall be $32.75 per hour.
will

include

waiting

to

hours- that

all

load

hours

Hours of use

including

and unload?

time

but^_will

spent
exclude

a unit may be down, fior mechanical

failure.
6,

All

checks

issued

by

the

State

of

Utah,

Department of Transportation, for the performance of the work
under the contract described above shall be issued jointly to
the Lessor and the Lessee.
7.
this

From

contract,

the proceeds of the Lessee's earnings on

in

addition

to

amounts

provided

for

in

Paragraph 5 above, the lessee shall pay to the Lessor the sum
of $132,277.79 plus interest from May 10, 1985, on the unpaid
balance at the rate of twelve percent per annum.

Such amount

shall be payable in equal amounts over the first ten weeks of
this contract.
days but

less

If the contract shall run the minimum of 60
than

ten weeks,

the total balance remaining

unpaid of said $132,277.79 shall be paid from the proceeds of
the final week.
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8.
standing,

So long as this contract shall remain in good

the Lessor agrees not

to issue execution on the

judgment already entered in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in Civil No.
C84-7447

and

agrees

Bonding Company.
Paragraph
action
fulfill

to

judgment

in full, Lessor agrees

to all parties.

the

obtain

against

the

Upon the payment of the amount provided in

7 above

as

not

terms

of

to dismiss

said

In the event Lessee does not

Paragraph

7

above,

the Lessor

may

immediately proceed with execution in Case No. C84-7447 and
may proceed to seek judgment in that case against the Bonding
Company.

9.

In the event it is necessary for any party to

this agreement to bring legal action to enforce its rights
thereunder, the prevailing party in such legal action shall
be

entitled

to

recover

all

of

its

costs

of

litigation

including a reasonable attorneys' fee.
SIGNED the day and date first above written.
L. A/'YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION
"LESSOR"!
^—^

Its

-5-

P r e s i d e n t 7 y t s

TRANSPORT LEASING
"LESSEE"

COMPANY

Its Partner

TRANSYSTEMS
"LESSEE"

INC,

OOOOl^
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EXHIBIT "B"

ADDENDUM TO LEASING AGREEMENT
WHEREAS,
Utah

corporation

Transport

Leasing

L. A-

Company,

Inc.,,%a

business

the

"Lessor"),

entered

Sons Construction

(hereinafter

Transystems,
in

Young

a

Montana

state

of

into

called
Montana

corporation

Utah,

a

the

Company, a

"Lessee"),

and

partnership,

and

qualified

(hereinafter

Leasing

Agreement

to

called
for

do
the

certain

tractor and trailer units, said Leasing Agreement being dated
the 24th day of May, 1985, and
WHEREAS,
Leasing

all

of

the

units

provided

for

in

such

Agreement were not available as of May 28, 1985, the

3tart-up date of said Leasing Agreement, and
WHEREAS, all of

the units will be available as of

June 10, 1985, and
WHEREAS, the parties have agreed on the charge to be
made for

the units that were available between May 28, 1985,

and June 10, 1985,
NOW,
agreements
parties

THEREFORE,

hereinafter

that

the

in

set

following

consideration

forth,

it

changes

of

is agreed
shall

be

the

mutual

between
made

in

the
the

contract entered into on the 24th day of May, 1985:
1.

The date on which the minimum lease period of 60

working days shall commence as provided in Paragraph 1 of said
agreement shall be June 10, 1985, rather than May 28, 1985.

2.

Compensation payable by the Lessee to the Lessor

for the period between May 28, 1985, and June 10, 1985, shall
be as follows:
Week Beginning May 28, 1985
230 Unit Hours x $35

$ 8,050.00

Week Beginning June 3, 1985
$13,037.50

372.5 Unit Hours x $35

$21,087.50

Total
3.

All other provisions of the leasing agreement

shall continue unchanged.
SIGNED this <-?/ day of^5^/1/gl-, 3)85.
L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION

"LESSOR,
/

By

/.

KJ^L,
"^
ts President

TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY
"LESSEE"

By

/s/
Michael Rice
Its Partner

TRANSYSTEMS, INC.
"LESSEE"

By

/s/ Michael Rice
Its President

OOOGlG.
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DONALD 8. HOLBROOK
CALVIN L. RAMPTON
W. ROBERT WRIGHT
RANOON W. WILSON
RONALD J. OCKEY
JACK LUNT
EDWARD J. M«OONOUOH
JAMES S. LOWRIE
RONNr L. CUTSMALL
MICHAEL R. MURPHY
CHRISTOPHER L. BURTON
LARRY C. HOLMAN
WILLIAM B. BOHLINQ
0. MILES HOLMAN
ROBERT S. M«CONNELL
GLEN D. WATKINS *
ANDREW W. BUFTMIRE
THOMAS E. K. CERRUTI
CRAIG R. MARIGER
OAVID B.LEE*
BRUCE E. TlTUS*tt
L. R. CURTIS, JR.

GRETTA C. SPENOLOVE
TIMOTHY B. ANOERSON
GREGG I. ALVORD
LARRY A. STEELE
SUZANNE WEST
ELIZABETH M. HASLAM
LJOMN LEWIS
JOELLEN M«GUIGAN*
G. RAND BEACHAM
RANDALL N. SKANCHY
JANET C. GRAHAM
BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN
BRUCE E. BABCOCK
DAVID R. MONEY
M. DIANE JASINSKI
GEORGE W. PRATT
PAUL M. HARMAN
SUE VOGEL
EVAN A. SCHMUTZ
BRENT A. BOHMAN
VIRGINIA S. SMITH
OALE R. CHAMBERLAIN

or COUNSCL

JOSEPHS. JONES
ROGER J. M«DONOUGH
FRANK ANTHONY ALLEN
•AOMITTCO
t AOMITTCO
$AOMlTTCO
• AOMITTCO

ATTORNEYS A N D C O U N S E L O R S

»MCC*» ft NAWlINg
NAWOMS ft CHITCMUOW
WAWLINS, TMyHMAN, WCOOCWOOO ft HUNO
MAWUNft, WAV ft MAWLINS
• MOC9MCTSCN, MAY ft NAWLIMt
I N O C t R C T K N , WAV, MAWUNft
ftCMMtSTCNftCN
•NOCainCTSKN, WAT, WAWLINS ft j O N C t
RAY, *AWUNS, JONCS ft HCNOCHSON

SALT LAKE CITY O T I C E
SOO FIRST INTERSTATE PLAZ4
170 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 6-4IOI
TELEPHONE (aOl) 521-3200
TELEX 3 2 4 8 9 8
TELEX 531-1700

l«7S
••»•
lft»7
l»OT
t»*9

WASHINGTON, O.C. QTriCE
SUITE 3 5 0
IOOI 2222 STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, O.C. 2 0 0 3 7
TELEPHONE (202) 2 0 8 - 5 9 5 0
TELECOPIER (202) 2 9 3 - 2 5 0 9

1941
• »<••
1MB

RESTON O r r i C E
I8IO MICHAEL FARAOAY ROAO
SUITE 102
RESTON, VIRGINIA 2 2 0 9 0
TELEPHONE (703) 4 3 7 - 8 2 4 2

August 1 3 ,

*NO HCSIOCNT IN WASHINGTON, O.C.
AND NCSIOCNT IN VIRGINIA
IN MAMTLANO
<N C A U r O * N I A ONLY

ST. GEORGE Q r f l C E
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 8 4 7 7 0
TELEPHONE (80l) 828-1827

1985

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Salt Lake City, Utah

John Preston Creer
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dear Mr. Creer:
I am writing this letter to you in regard to the bill submitted by Transysterns, Inc. to L. A. Young & Sons Construction
Company covering the period from June 24th, 1985 to July 18th,
1985. The entire bill is for $145,388.36 made up of the following items:
To apply on Judgment

52,911.12

Interest on Judgment

1,104.63

1,766.5 hours truck time at
$35 per hour
308 hours truck time at
$32 per hour
Repairs of damage to truck

61,827.50
9,856.00
19,684.11

You contest all of the charges for damages to the trucks
and $32,440.84 of the total of $71,683.50 truck charges. You
contest the truck rental charges on the ground that part of the
charge was applicable to hours not worked but for which we claim

0OOGX?

John Preston Creer
August 13, 1985
Page 2

a minimum charge was applicable.
It is our agreement that the entire check for $145,953.95
shall be deposited in escrow with The Continental Bank and Trust
Company. The Continental Bank shall thereupon make Transystems,
Inc. a check for $93,824.00 to cover the uncontested part of the
bill and deliver such check to us. This uncontested amount
includes:
Old Judgment
Interest on Old Judgment

$

52,911.12
1,104.63

875 hours double trucks at $35
per hour

30,625.00

287 hours single trucks at $32
per hour

9,184.00

The balance of $52,129.95 shall be held subject to the provisions
of the escrow agreement.
In regard to future billings, Transystems, Inc. will send
to L. A. Young Construction Company two bills, one covering amounts
applicable to the existing Judgment with interest thereon plus
the charge for hours worked under the current contract, the
other bill will cover any hours not worked, but which Transystems,
Inc. maintains are chargeable under the provisions of the contract plus any claims for damages of the trucks. If either bill
is contested by L. A. Young Construction Company, an attempt
will be made to adjust the differences by negotiation after such
negotiation is approved the first billing will be sent to the
Utah Department of Transportation for immediate payment. If
L. A. Young Construction Company contests the charges in the
second billing, an attempt will be made through negotiation,
and the agreed bill sent to the Utah Department of Transportation
for payment. If negotiation is not successful, then the second bill
together with any disputed amounts on the first billing will be
forwarded to the Utah Department of Transportation and the amounts
of such consolidated, but contested billing, will be paid into

oooc

John Preston Creer
August 13, 1985
Page 3

the escrow account at The Continental Bank subject to the provisions of the existing escrow agreement.
If you are in agreement with these provisions, please
indicate by signing below.
Sincerely,

EXHIBIT "D"

ESCROW AGREEMENT AND INSTRUCTIONS

TO:

The Continental Bank & Trust Company
200 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
IT IS AGREED by and between TRANSYSTEMS, INC., (Fed.

I.D. #810240143) hereinafter called "Transystems", and L. A.
YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION, (Fed. I.D. #870200278) hereinafter
called "Young", that they will deposit certain funds with the
Continental Bank & Trust Company, hereinafter called "Agent",
to be held, invested, managed and disbursed in accordance with
the terms, conditions and provisions of this agreement and
instructions as follows:
1.

Transystems and Young have endorsed a draft

issued by the State of Utah and made payable to Transystems and
Young jointly and in the amount of fel45,388.36. Transystems
and Young herewith deliver and deposit to Agent said check to
be held, managed, invested and disbursed in accordance with the
terms, conditions and directions contained in this agreement
and set of instructions.
2.

Upon receipt of the draft and upon receipt of the

actual funds represented by the draft referred to in
paragraph 1 above, Agent is authorized to make disbursement
from the sum deposited with Agent only to Transystems, Inc. in
the amount of Ninety-Three Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Four
Dollars ($93,824).

oooozc

3.

Money received by Agent in this escrow which is

not disbursed under the provisions of paragraph 2 above shall
be deposited in Agent's bank in an interest-bearing
Shearson-American T-fund or an equivalent interest-bearing fund
or account*

Agent shall have no duty or responsibility to

invest any of the balance of the funds in securities or other
property*

The Agent shall have full power to manage# control

and in all respects deal with all of the funds constituting
this escrow, and shall collect any interest that may be payable
thereon and add such interest to the said funds, to be held,
administered and managed as a part thereof until such time as
the provisions of this agreement and these instructions allow
Agent to disburse said funds*
4.

The Agent shall be authorized to deliver or

disburse the balance of the funds not paid out in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 2 above upon, and only upon,
either of the following two conditions:
a*

In accordance with written instructions

signed by both Transystems and Young or authorized
officers of the same.
b.

Pursuant to the provisions of a valid court

order.
5.

The undersigned parties, Transystems and Young,

agree to pay to agent $250 management fee for each year or a

-2-
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part of any given year in advance plus a fee for any
extraordinary services or activity performed by Agent.
fees may be deducted from held funds by Agent.

All

Transystems and

Young shall each be liable for one-half of all said fees.
i

\

6.

All notices, demands, or declaration of any kind

are to be given by any party to any other party, it shall be in
writing, signed by the party giving it or its attorney,
directed to the other party and mailed as follows:
Transystems, Inc.
c/o Calvin Rampton
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
L.A. Young Sons Construction
c/o John Preston Creer
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
The Continental Bank & Trust Company
200 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah
7.

84101

The provisions on the reverse of the standard

Escrow Contract of Agent are incorporated herein by reference
and attached hereto.
DATED this

i
/ V ^\3ay of August, 1985.
TRANSYSTEMS, INC.

ItT
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DATED this

/^) day of August, 198 5.
L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION

APPROVAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

I have read the above agreement and set of
instructions submitted by Transystems and Young and approve the
same.
DATED this

day of August, 1985.
CONTINENTAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY

By

/s/ Beet ElgIts

2398s
LAS
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ESCROW AGREEMENT
Escrow No,.
19
The Continental Bank and Trust Company
200 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Gentlemen:
The undersigned, (Seller)
hereinafter called "Grantor", whose address is
and (Buyer)
hereinafter called "Grantee", whose address is
herewith deliver to you in escrow, the documents and property hereinafter described, to be held and disposed of by you in accordance with the following instructions and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, to which the undersigned hereby agree.
PAPERS, INSTRUMENTS, MONEY and/or PROPERTY DEPOSITED:

YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
You are hereby authorized and directed to deliver the above described documents and property to
Grantee upon payment to you, at your above address, for the Grantor of the total sum of $
,
principal, ($
having already been paid by the Grantee to the Grantor on an original principal amount of $
annum from

) and interest on the unpaid balance thereof at
,19

, to be paid as follows:

per cent per

The undersigned hereby agree as follows:
1. The Continental Bank and Trust Company (hereinafter called the "bank"), is not a party, or
bound by any agreement which may be evidenced by or arise out of the foregoing instructions.
** T v " u r*' ; - he- Sy authorized to receive any or ail such payments or any part thereof at any
time after the dates herein specified therefor and prior to receipt of notice of default delivered to the
bank in writing by Grantor.
3. The bank acts hereunder as a depositary only, and is not responsible or liable in any manner
whatever for the sufficiency, correctness, genuineness or validity of any instrument deposited with it
hereunder, or with respect to the form or execution of the same, or the identity, authority, or rights of
any person executing or depositing the same.
/wwmo/i
4. The bank shall not be required to take or be bound by notice of any default of any personvW^»^l^4
to take any action with respect to such default involving any expense or Inability, unless notice in writing
is given an officer of the bank of such default by the undersigned or any of them, and unless it is indemnified in a manner satisfactory to it against any such expense or liability.
5. The bank shall be protected in acting upon any notice, request, waiver, consent, receipt or other
paper or document believed by the bank to be genuine and tc be signed by the proper party or parties.
6. The bank shall not be liable for any error of judgment or for any act done or step taken or
omitted by it in good faith, or for any mistake of fact or law, or for anything which it may do or refrain
from doing in connection herewith, except its own wilful misconduct.
7. The bank shall not be answerable for the default or misconduct of any agent, attorney or employee appointed by it if such agent or employee shall have been selected with reasonable care.
8. The bank may advise with legal counsel in the event of any dispute or question as to the construction of the foregoing instructions, or the bank's duties thereunder and the bank shall incur no liability and shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with the opinion and instructions of such counsel.
9. The bank shall have a first lien on the property and papers held by it hereunder, for its compensation and for any costs, liability, expense or counsel fees it may incur.
10. In the event of any disagreement between the undersigned or any of them, and/or the person
or persons named in the foregoing instruction, and/or any other person, resulting in adverse claims and demands being made in connection with or for any papers, money or property involved herein or affected
hereby, the bank shall be entitled at its option to refuse to comply with any such claim or demand, so
long as such disagreement shall continue, and in so refusing the bank may make no delivery or other disposition of any money, papers or property involved herein or affected hereby and in so doing the bank shall
not be or become liable to the undersigned or any of them or to any person named in the foregoing instructions for its failure or refusal to comply with such conflicting or adverse demands; and the bank
shall be entitled to continue so to refrain and refuse so to act until:
(1) The rights of the adverse claimants have been finally adjudicated in a court assuming
and having jurisdiction of the parties and the money, papers and property involved herein or affected hereby; and/or
(2) All differences shall have been adjusted by agreement and the bank shall have been notified thereof in writing signed by all of the persons interested.
11. No assignment or transfer of this escrow agreement or of any documents or property, including money, held in this escrow or of any interest therein can be made, but said documents and property
may be withdrawn and this escrow agreement terminated by mutual consent.
12. The undersigned agree to pay to the bank the sum of $
as an acceptance
fee with respect to its sen-ices hereunder for one year from the date hereof and further hereby agree to
pay the Hank an additional fee of one-tenth of one per cent of all funds received hereunder, provided however, that a minimum fee of $
shall be charged for each payment received. It is also
agreed that additional compensation shall also be paid to the bank for any additional or extraordinary services it may be required to render hereunder. Should any money, document or property remain in escrow
after one year from date hereof, the undersigned hereby agree to pay the bank the sum of $
for each year or fraction of year that such money, document or property is held by the bank hereunder;
and in the event such annual charge remains unpaid for a period of one year, the bank shall have the
right and is hereby authorized and directed to close its records with respect hereto and destroy any documents held by it hereunder.

GRANTOR
GRANTEE
The Continental Bank and Trust Company hereby acknowledges receipt of the letter of instructions
of which the foregoing is a copy and of the papers, money or property therein referred to and agrees to
hold and dispose of the same in accordance with said instructions and upon the terms and conditions
above set forth.
THE CONTINENTAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
Date:
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Trust Officer

Received from The Continental Bank and Trust Company all of the papers and documents referred
to above.
Date:
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ADDENDUM "E"

Title 14. C h ^ i r 1. Drc. E. U.C.A., 1P53, ai Ainr.ndcd

KNOW ALL Z:XN BY THESE PRESENTS:
L
Th*t
* A - Y o u n S Sons Construction Co., Inc.
1

*l
*
"Prlrclpal," tod .—..Jlplf?J?.S. e . I n s i , r a n c e

.

•
Company

, „

fcirefna/ier

referred to o the

a corporation orxx-oJied *j>d wdrOj&x UDder th* IIWI of the StAie of ...JteJOOSxl.vaa.ia.
Ullli i u principal office la the City of . £ L l J . ! . ^
teflai/Ur
r r i e r r ^ to a, tbe
•T.irct> t M *-re Mid r^d /JrzaJy bo--r»d u&to th* Seale of Utah by tnd through the Utah Department of Transportation.
r^rrJaiJtflr rcicrrcd to aji the "ObUt?<. M to lb* ajr>ount of „N*n?Ll!?:J.].L?^^^^

•Thousand^ Eigh t Hund^

"TOoLUn (I 9 ; 9*0.893 . 25,

25/100

for fist piymol
*1,crcof, the eaJd Principal and Surety bind th£m*elT©i, their heiri, admin I at ratori, ax*xutor*.
svecesaor* t/>d rjiufcni, Jointly e/>d esTeraJJy, firmlyby (hc»e pre»enli.
WHEREAS, the Principal hxj cotered into tcertainwritten contract vlth the Obligee, dated the
dty of

*

19

lo cooitmct ..?!!££ gp.P.FX^^

Protection
in the County of
/or the

Wroxim*te

?.?I?..i*!$S

St*t* of Ut ait, Prt,J«t No. J 5 f . 5 2 : . ? . . ( 1 ? 1 L 9 *

»un> of . 5 £ . ? . ? . . £ 1 ^

KUnetv-three^
Dollar* ( l # 9 | l * 9 . i . ? . ? 5 . : . ? 5
J, which contract It hereby referred
/.o /»-nd mrdt t pirt h;rcof a§ fully tnd to the tame extent if if copied at lemfth herein.
.f
.NOW, TUZnETOnZ. the condition of this obligation ft ruch, that Jf the juJd Principal #bail pty ail claimants
Duj-plyinj k t o r or material* to him or hi* /*ubconlrsetoff in the prosecution of the work prodded for JD *aid
contract, tb*n, thii obligation rhrJl be told, other*! te lo remain in fulJ force tod effect.
PROVIDED. HOWEVER, that thJi bond in executed pjraruant to the proriiloni of Title 14, Ch/ipter 3, Utah
Code Annotated. 1P53, XJ rjDci>dvdt and all liabilities on thii bood to all jrucb claim-ant* ahx!! be determined in
accordance *lth p/Jd prorialoo*. to the mine *xteot a* 11 It were copied at length herein.
IK WITNESS WHEREOF, the c/Jd Principal and Surety hare lijpaed and sealed thii instrument thii .?.?„£
any of

l*

...

L.A.
UTTNESS OR ATTEST AT>DNj7 / f

^

<nzr.

Youncr Sons Con

•uc-rTon t o ,

^MD

( ^ ^ ^ j ^ a t ^ r t n . ^ Z ^ ^

/u^m.iiM.JM^

CL

dL

PrlnclpiJ

Reliance Insurance Company

J\Qi.^.^.\.^L<V^J^^
^
\,
STATE OF UTAH
\
COUNTY OF s S g / t i f t ? ^ '

— B/.
Aitomey-in-F^ct
'

J

^•^•U^rX^M^-.QlC^rJjynd*...-*.^*...^*-*. b«lnj flrit duly trwono oo oith dinposet and i t y i . tin! h* ii the
Atloroey-m.Fact of the
R?i.?-.§^9*. J n S ! ^
^
ajid Ihxt bt if duly authorized to execute and delirer the forcjoln{ obllfatJoo. that *aid Company It autborlnd
to execute the tame, ai>d hxa coroplfed (n all reaped* wJth the lawa of Utah In reference to becominj toie wr^ty
icpoo hcmda» Undertaking*, and obli^atloni.
^q
,
y^J^y
/
/

'

'

-

'

rr

.<£M*M£MMM

* <2.!L day of .....

KcxhfcrU>cd mnd twurn to before me IhJa .....Q/.

%\y csmirni>»<lt>n

cxpIr;,:

LoJh:A(£~.

AIM'HOVKU ASTg^OIfM
\*xl*\*rd

.KUttnK'y (k*n<*rj»I

J-Utii
Nct»ry Public

ADDENDUM "F"

EXHIBIT "A"

LEASING AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT
May,

1985, by

Company,

a

"Lessee"),

between

Utah
and

partnership,
qualified

and

is entered

A. Young

corporation

Transport

and

L.

into this

(hereinafter

Leasing

Transystems,

Sons

Company,

Inc., a Montana

day of
Construction
called
a

the

Montana

Corporation

to do business in the state of Utah, (hereinafter

called the "Lessor")•
W I T N E S S T H
WHEREAS, the Lessee has entered into a contract with
the

Department

of

Transportation

of

the State of Utah to

perform certain construction work on a road project in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, designated as the Black Rock to
Old Saltaire Road, No. IR-80-3 (95) 102, and
WHEREAS, the Lessee desires to lease from the Lessor
certain equipment as hereinafter described for the purpose of
performing such contract, and
WHEREAS, the Lessee is indebted to the Lessor on two
prior
Project

contracts
and

designated

the Millard

as

the

Burmester

Interchange

County Road Project in the sum of

$132,277.79, a portion of which has been reduced to judgment
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, in a case designated as C84-7447, and

WHEREAS, Reliance
qualified

Insurance Company, a corporation

to do business in the State of Utah

(hereinafter

called the "Bonding Company11) executed the bond covering the
Burmester Project and the Millard County Road Project and is
also issuing a bond to the State of Utah covering the Black
Rock to Old Saltaire Road contract; and
WHEREAS,
the agreements
furnished

the Bonding

Company,

hereinafter entered

the Lessor

with

a

in consideration

of

into by the Lessor, has

separate

letter

agreement

by

which the Bonding Company agrees that the provisions of this
contract will in no way affect the liability of the Bonding
Company

in regard

to the Burmester Interchange Project and

the Millard County Road Project,
NOW,
agreements

THEREFORE,

hereinafter

in

consideration

of

the

mutual

set forth, it is agreed between the

parties as follows:
1.

The Lessor

shall lease to the Lessee and the

Lessee shall lease from the Lessor for use in the performance
of

the contract with the Utah Department of Transportation

mentioned above eight (8) tractor and trailer units for the
handling and hauling of sand* gravel, fill material and other
similar substances, each unit to have a capacity of 50 tons.
The lease shall be for a period of at least 60 working days,
to commence on the
2*

^^3

day of / ^ / ^ ^ ^ ^

, 1985.

The Lessor shall furnish the said equipment in

-2-

in good

condition

provide

and during

maintenance,

licensing,

the

except

insurance,

terms of

as

permits,

the lease will

hereinafter
and

shall

provided,

provide,

in

addition, two full time supervisors to supervise the Lessor's
obligations under the lease.
3.
and

fuel

The Lessee shall furnish and pay for all fuel

taxes, all

labor,

including

all

tax

and

fringe

benefits, and all services required in the loading, weighing,
and unloading of such trucks.
4.
be

damaged

In the event any of the leasted equipment shall
through

the

negligence

of

the Lessee

or

the

Lessee's employees, the Lessee shall be responsible for the
repair

of

such

damage.

The

Lessee

shall

have

the

responsibility of maintaining the roads over which the leased
equipment will be operated in a suitable condition so that
unreasonable or excessive wear and tear to the leased units
shall not result from the operation.
5.

Payment

shall be made from the Lessee to the

Lessor as follows:
a.

$41,250 as a mobilization charge which shall be
payable out of
Department

of

the first payment
Transportation

of

made by
the

the

State

of

equipment,

in

Utah on estimated work performed.
b.

Payments

for

the

addition

to the mobilization

-3-

lease

of

the

charge

set

forth

above,
unit

shall be $35 per hour for each hauling

for

minimum

a minimum
of

of

60 working

16

hours

days.

If

a day

for a

the average

usage of all eight units shall exceed 18 hours
per day in any one day, all hours over 18 hours
per day shall be $32.75 per hour.
will

include

waiting

to

hours- that

all

load

hours

Hours of use

including

time

and unload, but will

spent

exclude

a unit may be down.fior mechanical

failure.
6.

All

checks

issued

by

the

State

of

Utah,

Department of Transportation, for the performance of the work
under the contract described above shall be issued jointly to
the Lessor and the Lessee.
7.
this

From

contract,

the proceeds of the Lessee's earnings on

in

addition

to

amounts

provided

for

in

Paragraph 5 above, the lessee shall pay to the Lessor the sum
of $132,277.79 plus interest from May 10, 1985, on the unpaid
balance at the rate of twelve percent per annum.

Such amount

shall be payable in equal amounts over the first ten weeks of
this contract.
days but

less

If the contract shall run the minimum of 60
than

ten weeks, the total balance remaining

unpaid of said $132,277.79 shall be paid from the proceeds of
the final week.
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8.
standing,

So long as this contract shall remain in good

the Lessor

agrees not

to issue execution on the

judgment already entered in the Third Judicial District Court
in and

for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in Civil No,

C84-7447

and

agrees

Bonding Company.
Paragraph
action
fulfill

to

the

immediately

to

obtain

judgment

against

the

Upon the payment of the amount provided in

7 above

as

not

in full, Lessor

all parties.
terms

of

agrees

to dismiss

said

In the event Lessee does not

Paragraph

7

above,

the

Lessor

may

proceed with execution in Case No. C84-7447 and

may proceed to seek judgment in that case against the Bonding
Company.

9.

In the event it is necessary for any party to

this agreement

to bring legal action to enforce its rights

thereunder, the prevailing party in such legal action shall
be

entitled

to

recover

all

of

its

costs

of

litigation

including a reasonable attorneys' fee.
SIGNED the day and date first above written.

-5-

TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY
"LESSEE"

1
yts P
TRANSYSTEMS INC.
"LESSEE"

•resident

-6-

/

C

EXHIBIT "B"

ADDENDUM TO LEASING AGREEMENT
WHEREAS, L. A. Young
Utah

corporation

Transport

Leasing

(hereinafter
Company,

Transystems,

Inc.,, a

business

the

in

"Lessor"),

entered

Sons Construction Company, a

a

Montana

state

of

into

called
Montana

corporation

Utah,

a

"Lessee11),

and

partnership,

and

the

qualified

(hereinafter

Leasing

Agreement

to

called
for

do
the

certain

tractor and trailer units, said Leasing Agreement being dated
the 24th day of May, 1985, and
WHEREAS,

all

of

the

units

provided

for

in

such

Leasing Agreement were not available as of May 28, 1985, the
start-up date of said Leasing Agreement, and
WHEREAS, all of the units will be available as of
June 10, 1985, and
WHEREAS, the parties have agreed on the charge to be
made for the units that were available between May 28, 1985,
and June 10, 1985,
NOW,
agreements
parties

THEREFORE,

hereinafter

that

the

in

set

following

consideration

forth,

it

changes

of

is agreed
shall

be

the

mutual

between
made

in

the
the

contract entered into on the 24th day of May, 1985:
1.

The date on which the minimum lease period of 60

working days shall commence as provided in Paragraph 1 of said
agreement shall be June 10, 1985, rather than May 28, 1985.

2.

Compensation payable by the Lessee to the Lessor

for the period between May 28, 1985, and June 10, 1985, shall
be as follows:
Week Beginning May 28, 1985
230 Unit Hours x $35

$ 8,050.00

Week Beginning June 3, 1985
372.5 Unit Hours x $35

$13,037.50

Total
3.

$21,087.50

All other provisions of the leasing agreement

shall continue unchanged.
SIGNED this <5V

day o f ^ S ^ / l / z L . 2*85.
L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION
"LESSOR.

/ rv-

—

By(//y^cT<^
Its" President
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY
"LESSEE"

By

/s/ Michael Rice
Its Partner

TRANSYSTEMS, INC.
"LESSEE"

By

-2-

/s/ Michael Rice
Its President

ADDENDUM "G"

ED MIDGLEY 6c ASSOCIATES
RAYMOND P. FENLON, RPR
700 NEWHOUSE BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

2
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

3

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
5
6
7

TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY,
A MONTANA PARTNERSHIP, AND
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., A
MONTANA CORPORATION QUALIFIED
TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF UTAH,

8
9
10
11
12

PLAINTIFFS,
VS
L.A. YOUNG SONS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, A
UTAH CORPORATION, AND
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY,
A CORPORATION,

13
14

DEPOSITION OF:
CALVIN L. RAMPTON

CIVIL NO. 85-8421
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

DEFENDANTS,
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY,
A CORPORATION,

15
PLAINTIFF,
16
VS.
17
18
19
20
21
22

TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY,
A MONTANA PARTNERSHIP, AND
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., A
MONTANA CORPORATION QUALIFIED
TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE
OF UTAH; L.A. YOUNG SONS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, A
UTAH CORPORATION,

CIVIL NO. C87-1984
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

DEFENDANTS,

23
24
25

fC@py

1

IS THAT CORRECT?

2
3

A

THAT'S RIGHT.

ONCE AGAIN, I'M SURE WITH BOTH OF US

HAVING THE APPROVAL OF OUR CLIENTS.

4

(WHEREUPON, DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NO. 3 MARKED

5

FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

6

Q

MR. RAMPTON, I HAVE MARKED FOR EXHIBIT NO. 3 AN

7

ITEM CALLED "ESCROW AGREEMENT AND INSTRUCTIONS."

8

FAMILIAR WITH THIS DOCUMENT?

ARE YOU

9

A

YES.

10

Q

REFERRING TO PAGE THREE, IS THAT YOUR SIGNATURE ON

11

BEHALF OF TRANSYSTEMS INCORPORATED?

12

A

YES.

13

Q

DID YOU HAVE EXPRESS AUTHORITY FROM TRANSYSTEMS TO

14
15
16

SIGN THIS DOCUMENT?
A

IF YOU'LL ASK ME IN INTERROGATORY, I'LL GIVE YOU

THE FULL INFORMATION.

17

MR. STEELE:

AT THE RISK OF GUMMING UP THE

18

RECORD, I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY YOU'RE INQUIRING INTO THAT.

19

ATTORNEY ALWAYS ACTS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS CLIENT.

20

THAT'S THE NATURE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.

21

MR. FETZER:

22

LITTLE BIT AND THEN WE'LL GET INTO THAT.

23

MR. STEELE:

AN

LET HIM DEVELOP SOME QUESTIONS A

ARE YOU TRYING TO DISPROVE THAT WE

24

HAD AUTHORITY TO ACT FOR OUR CLIENT O R — I DON'T UNDERSTAND

25

THAT.
12

1
2
3
4

Q

I MERELY WANT TO KNOW WHAT AUTHORITY YOU HAD TO

A

IF YOU WILL ASK US IN AN INTERROGATORY, MY CLIENT

ACT.

WILL ANSWER THAT.

5

Q

ARE YOU REFUSING TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION?

6

A

YES I AM, AS A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

AND I

7

HAVEN'T THE AUTHORITY TO WAIVE THE PRIVILEGE, EVEN THOUGH IT

8

MAY BE INNOCUOUS.

9

Q

DID YOU DRAFT THIS DOCUMENT*?

10

A

NO.

11

Q

DO YOU KNOW WHO DID?

12

A

MR. STEELE.

13

Q

THE ATTORNEY, LARRY STEELE?

14

A

YES.

15

Q

DID YOU APPROVE OF THIS DOCUMENT ONCE IT WAS

16

DRAFTED?

17

A

YES.

18

Q

DID MR. CREER APPROVE OF THIS DOCUMENT?

19

A

YES.

20

Q

WERE THE ITEMS CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT A RESULT

21

OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN YOU AND MR. CREER?

22

A

YES.

23

Q

WERE THERE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN YOUR CLIENT AND

24
25

L.A. YOUNG CONCERNING THIS DOCUMENT?
A

I WOULD THINK NOT.

13

1

Q

IS IT SAFE TO ASSUME THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH

2

DEVELOPED THIS DOCUMENT WERE SIMILAR TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH

3

DEVELOPED PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 1?

4

A

PART AND PARCEL OF THE SAME THING.

5

Q

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN YOU AND MR. CREER?

6

A

YES.

7

Q

ARE YOU AN OFFICER OF TRANSYSTEMS?

8

A

NO.

9

Q

LEGAL COUNSEL?

10

A

YES.

11

Q

ARE YOU A STOCKHOLDER OF TRANSYSTEMS?

12

A

NO.

13

Q

DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER INTEREST WITH TRANSYSTEMS?

14

A

I'M THEIR COUNSEL.

15

Q

WHOSE IDEA WAS IT TO ESTABLISH THIS ESCROW?

16

A

I'M NOT REALLY SURE WHETHER MR. CREER MENTIONED IT

I'M THEIR COUNSEL.

17

FIRST OR I MENTIONED IT FIRST, BUT WHICHEVER DID, THE OTHER

18

READILY ACCEPTED IT AS A COMMON-SENSE WAY OF MEETING A PROBLEM

19

WE HAD.

20
21
22

Q

WAS THE DEVELOPMENT OR THE ESTABLISHING OF THIS

ESCROW YOUR IDEA?
A

I JUST DON'T REMEMBER.

WE WERE TALKING ATTEMPTING

23

TO RESOLVE A QUESTION.

WE HAD SOME MONEY HERE; THEY WANTED TO

24

GIVE US SOME OF IT, BUT THEY DIDN'T WANT TO GIVE US ALL OF IT.

25

WE DIDN'T WANT TO GIVE IT BACK TO THEM.

SO WE WERE DISCUSSING
14

ADDENDUM "H"

ESCROW AGREEMENT AND INSTRUCTIONS

TO:

The Continental Bank & Trust Company
200 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.
IT IS AGREED by and between TRANSYSTEMS, INC., (Fed.

I.D* #810240143) hereinafter called "Transystems", and L. A.
YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION, (Fed. I.D. #870200278) hereinafter
called "Young", that they will deposit certain* funds with the
Continental Bank & Trust Company, hereinafter called "Agent",
to be held, invested, managed and disbursed in accordance with
the terms, conditions and provisions of this agreement and
instructions as follows:
1.

Transystems and Young have endorsed a draft

issued by the State of Utah and made payable to Transystems and
Young jointly and in the amount of fel45,380.36. Transystems
and Young herewith deliver and deposit to Agent said check to
be held, managed, invested and disbursed in accordance with the
terms, conditions and directions contained in this agreement
and set of instructions.
2.

Upon receipt of the draft and upon receipt of the

actual funds represented by the draft referred to in
paragraph 1 above, Agent is authorized to taake disbursement
from the sum deposited with Agent only to Transystems, Inc. in
the amount of Ninety-Three Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Four
Dollars (393,824) .

3.

Money received by Agent in this escrow which is

not disbursed under the provisions of paragraph 2 above shall
be deposited in Agent's bank in an interest-bearing
Shearson-American T-fund or an equivalent interest-bearing fund
or account*

Agent shall have no duty or responsibility to

invest any of the balance of the funds in securities or other
property.

The Agent shall have full power to manage, control

and in all respects deal with all of the funds constituting
this escrow, and shall collect any interest that may be payable
thereon and add such interest to the said funds, to be held,
administered and managed as a part thereof until such time as
the provisions of this agreement and these instructions allow
Agent to disburse said funds*
4.

The Agent shall be authorized to deliver or

disburse the balance of the funds not paid out in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 2 above upon, and only upon,
either of the following two conditions:
a.

In accordance with written instructions

signed by both Transystems and Young or authorized
officers of the same*
b.

Pursuant to the provisions of a valid court

order.
5.

The undersigned parties, Transystems and Young,

agree to pay to agent $250 management fee for each year or a
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part of any given year in advance plus a fee for any
extraordinary services or activity performed by Agent.
fees- may be deducted from held funds by Agent.

All

Transystems and

Young shall each be liable for one-half of all said fees.
6.

All notices, demands, or declaration of any kind

are to be given by any party to any other party, it shall be in
writing, signed by the party giving it or its attorney,
directed to the other party and mailed as follows:
Transystems, Inc.
c/o Calvin Rampton
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
L.A. Young Sons Construction
c/o John Preston Creer
1200 Beneficial Life Towir
36 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84ill
The Continental Bank & Trust Company
200 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah
7.

84101

The provisions on the reverse of the standard

Escrow Contract of Agent are incorporated herein by reference
and attached hereto.
DATED this / U ^""May of August, 19fi5.
TRANSYSTEMS, itfC.
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DATED this /^>

day of August, 1985.
L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION

APPROVAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

I have read the above agreement and set of
instructions submitted by Transystems and Young and approve the
same.
DATED this

day of August, 1985.
CONTINENTAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY

By

/3/
Its

z396s
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Bert Elg-

ADDENDUM " I "

Paul R. Howell
(USB 1556)
Clark B. Fetzer (USB 1069)
David L. Hughes (USB 4744)
HOWELL, FETZER & HUGHES
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reliance Insurance Company
700 Continental Bank Building
200 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-1503
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY,
a Montana partnership, and
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a
Montana corporation qualified
to do business in the State
of Utah,

STIPULATION

Plaintiffs,
vs.
L. A. YOUNG SONS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, and
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation.

Civil No. 85-8421
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY,
a Montana partnership, and
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a
Montana corporation qualified
to do business in the State
of Utah; L. A. YOUNG SONS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Defendants.

Civil No. C87-1984
Judge Frank G. Noel

The parties to the above-entitled action through their
respective attorneys stipulate as follows:
1.

The following facts are admitted by all parties and

shall be taken as true for the purposes of this action:
(a) The hourly charge for single truck units (one
tractor and one trailer) is $32.00 per hour.
(b) The total unpaid hours for single truck units
is 78 hours.
(c) The hourly rate for double truck units (one
tractor and two trailers) is $35.00 per hour.
(d) The unpaid hours of double truck units is 1,451
hours.
(e) Summary:

2.

Single Truck Units

78 x $32=

$ 2,496.00

Double Truck Units

1,451 x $35=

$50,785.00

There is a difference of 8.5 hours between defendant

L. A. Young Sons Construction Company ("Youngs11) and
plaintiffs1 calculation of unpaid hours.

The parties hereto

stipulate and do agree to liquidate this amount by
compromising their differences to amount to 4.25 hours with
the hourly rate compromised to $33.50 per hour.
(a)
3.

4.25 compromised hours x $33.50=

$142.57

The total outstanding rental charge amounts to

$53,423.37.
4.

No evidence of said facts other than this stipulation

need be adduced upon the trial.

5.

This stipulation is limited to an admission of the

truth of the facts stipulated.
6.

The parties reserve the right to offer evidence as to

all facts not herein expressly agreed upon.
7.

This stipulation is for purposes of trial of the

above-entitled action only, and the matters contained herein
are not admitted for the purpose of any other trial or
litigation.
DATED this

J*y

day of JuTte-. 1987

L^erry A.yStee
(ones, ^Jtfaldo, Holbrook & McDonough
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

_cw.

David L. Hughes
Howell, Fetzer & Hughes
Attorneys for
Reliance Insurance Company
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ADDENDUM "J"

FP1
RELIA: CE

nsrsiTR.A.iTCE c.

DMEAJSTY
3

3 I 35

CONTINUING AGREEMENT OF INDEMNITY-CONTRACTOR'S FORM

HOC HFRT
THfS AGREEMENr is made by (he undersigned for (he continuing benefit of (he RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Pennsylvania corporation (hereinafter.referred to as
the Surety), for the purpose of saving it harmless and indemnifying il from all loss and expense in connection with any Bonds executed on behalf ol My one or more of
the following persons, firms or corporations:
•
•••••,.

L.A.YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION, Inc., a Utah Corporation

(hereinafter referred to as Contractor).

WITNESSETH.
WHEREAS, the Contractor, individually or jointly with others, may desire or be required from time io time to give certain bonds, undertakings, or instruments of guarantee (all of which will hereinafter be included within the term "8ond" or "Bonds"), and
WHEREAS, upon the express condition that this instrument be executed, the Surety has executed or procured the execution of. and may hereafter execute or procure the
execution of such Bonds.
MOW, THEREFORE, ^'consideration of the eieculion ol any such Bond or Bonds and as an inducement to such execution, we. the undersigned, agree and bind ourselves.
our heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, as follows:
FIRST: To pay all premiums on said Bonds computed in accordance with the Surety's regular manual of rates in effect on (he date sard Bonds are executed
SECOND: To indemnify, and keep indemnified, and hofd arid save harmless the Surety against all demands, claims. loss, costs, damages, expenses and attorneys' lees
whatever, and any and ail liability therefor, sustained or incurred by the Surety by reason of executing or procuring the execution of any said Bond or Bonds, or any other
8onds, which may be already or hereafter executed on behalf of the Contractor, or renewal or continuation thereof: or sustained or incurred by reason of making any
investigation on account (hereof, prosecuting or defending any action brought in connection (herewith, obtaining a release (herefrom, recovering or attempting to
recover any salvage in connection (herewith or enforcing by litigation or otherwise any of the agreements herein contained. Payment of amounts due Surety hereunder
together with fegaf interest snail be payaofe upon demand.
THIRD: To lurnish money (o the Contractor or to (he Surety as needed lor the prompt payment of labor, materials, and any other costs or expenses m connection with
the performance of contracts when and as requested to do so by the Surety.
FOURTH: To assign, transfer and convey, and each of the undersigned does by these presents assign, transfer and convey to the Surety, as of the date of execution of
said Bond or Bonds, as collateral security for the full perlormance of (he covenants and agreements herein contained and the payment of any other indebtedness or
liability of the undersigned to (he Surety, whether heretofore or hereafter incurred, the following:
(a) All right, title and interest of the undersigned in and to ail machinery, equipment, plant, tools and materials which are. on the date of execution of any such
Bond or Bonds, or may thereafter be. about or upon (he site of the work to be performed under the contract referred to in and guaranteed by such Bond, or else
where for the puroose thereof, including as well materials purchased for or chargeable to said contract which may be in process of construction or in storage else
where or in transportation to said site:
(b) All ngnts of the undersigned in. or growing in any manner out of. said contract or any extensions, modifications, changes or aKerations thereof or additions
thereto:
(c) All rights, actions, causes of action, claims and demands whatsoever which the undersigned or any ol them may have or acouire in any subccntract in connection
with said contract, and against any subcontractor or any person, firm or ccrooration furnishing or agreeing to furnish or supply faoor. materials, supplies, machinery,
tools or other equipment m connection with or on account of said contract, and against any surety or sureties of any such materialmen, subcontractor, laborer zr
other person, firm or corporation:
(d) All right, title and interest of the undersigned in and to any and ail percentages retained by the obligee under said contract, and any and all estimates, payments, extras, final payments and other sums that, at the time of abandonment, forfeiture or breach ol said contract or such 3ond or Bonds or of tiie terms of this
Agreement or at the time of any advance, payment or guaranty by the Suiety for the puroose of avoiding.such abandonment, forfeiture or breach, may be due or may
thereafter become due under said contract to or on behalf of the undersigned, together with any and aif sums due or which may thereafter become due under or on
alt other contracts, bonded or unbonded, in which any or ail of the urdersigned have an interest.
FIFTH: Each of the undersrgned does hereby irrevocably nominate 3nd aooomt any officer of the Surety the true and lawful attorney-in-fact of (he undersigned. *»(h
full right and authority, in (he event the Contractor fails or is unable to complete the work called lor by the contract guaranteed by any 8ond or in the event of the
breach of any provision of this Agreement to execute on benaif of. and sign the names of each of the undersigned to. any voucher, release, satisfaction, check, bill of
sale of all or any prooerty by this Agreement assigned to the Surety or any other paoer or contract necessary or desired to carry into erfect the purposes of this Agreement: with full ri^ht and authority also, in such event, to dispose of the performance of said contract by subletting the same m the name of the Contractor or otherwise:
and each of the undersigned does hereby ratify and confirm afl (hat such attorney-in-fact or the Surety may lawfully do in the premises and further authorizes and empowers the Surety and such attorney-in-fact and each of (hem to enter upon and take possession of the tools, plant, equipment, materials and subcontracts and all other
collateral security mentioned in (his Agreement and enforce, use. employ and disoose thereof for the purposes set forth in this Agreement. Each of the undersigned
specifically agrees to protect, indemnify and hold harmless the Surety and such attorney-in-fact against any and all claims, damages, costs and expenses lhat may m
any way arise or grow out of the exercise of the assignments contained in this Agreement and (he powers herein granted, soecifically waiving any claim which iny undersigned has or might hereafter have against the Surety or such attorney-in-fact on account ol anything done in eniorcing the terms ol this agreement, assignments and
powerof-attorney.
8OR7009CO U 7

S I X T H * Tht( the entire contract price of any
*wt referred to in a Bond or Bonds, whether in the posses
the undersigned or another, shall be and hereby
is i m p e u e d with a trust in favor ot Suttty for the payment of obligations incurred for labor, materials and serviu. in the performance of the contract work lor which
Surety would be liable under such Bond or Bonds and for the purpose of satisfying the conditions of the Bond executed in connection with the contract.
S E V E N T H : That if Surety shall be required or shall deem it necessary to set j p a reserve in any amount to cover any claim, demand, liability, expense, suit, order.
judgment or adjudication under or on any Bond or Bonds or for any other reason whatsoever, to immediately upon demand deposit with. Surety an amount of money sufficient to cover such reserve and any increase thereof, such funds to be held by Surety as collateral, in addition to the indemnity a f t j / d e O y tJirs instrument, wjth the
right to use such funds or any part thereof, at any time, in payment or compromise of any lability, claims, demands, judgment, damages, fees and disbursements or
other expenses: jnd the undersigned, in the event of their failure to comply with such demand, hereby authorize and empower any attorney of any court of recordof the
United States or any of its territories or possessions, to appear for them or any of them in any suit by Surety and to confess judgment against them or any of {hem for
any sum or sums of money up to the amount of any or all 8ond or Bonds. w»th costs, interest and reasonable attorneys' lees, such judgment, however, to be satisfied
upon the payment of any and all such sums as may be found due by the undersigned to Surety under the terms of this Agreement. Demp/id shall befsufficient if sent by
registered or certified mail to the undersigned at the address or addresses given herein or last nnown to Surety, whether or not actually received.
E I G H T H : Alt collateral security held by or assigned to the Surety may be used by the Surety at any time in payment of any claim. loss or expense which the undersigned have agreed to pay hereby, whether or not such claim, loss or expense arises out of or in connection with such Bond or contract under which suc6 Co/lateral is
held. The Surety may sell or realize upon any or all such collateral security, at public or private sale, with or wrthout notice to |Mfe widjerpgned x>r any of them, and with
the right to be'purchaser itself at any such public sale, and shall be accountable to the undersigned only for such surplus or r e f f l a i f W o f suc^oNalfcra^ouflty or tfc*
proceeds thereof as may be in the Surety s possession after it has been fully indemnified as in this Agreement provided. The Surety shall not be lifturfor d t ^ a s e i
value or loss or destruction of or damage to such security, however caused.
N I N T H : The Surety shall have the right, at its option and in its sole discretion*
(a) Jo deem this Agreement breached should the Contractor become involved in any agreement or proceeding of liquidation, receivership, or bankruptcy, voluntarily or involuntarily, or should the Contractor if an individual die. be convicted of a felony, become a fugitive from justice, or for any reason disappears and cannot
immediately be found by the Surety by use ot usual methods.
(b) To take possession of the work under any contract and at the expense of the undersigned to complete or to contract for the completion of the same, or to
consent to the re-ietttng oi the completion thereof by the obligee m said contract Bond or Bonds, or to take such other steps as in the discretion of the Surety may
be advisable or necessary to obtain its release or to secure itself from I o n thereunder.
(c) Jo adjust settle or compromise any claim, demand, suit or judgment upon said Bond or Bonds, or any of them, unless the undersigned shall request in writing the Surety to litigate such claim or demand, or defend such suit, or appeal from such judgment, and shall deposit with the Surety, it the time of such request
cash or collateral satisfactory to th" Surety in kind and amount to be used in paying any judgment or judgments rendered with interest, costs and attorneys fees.
All damage, loss or expense of any nature which the Surety may incur under Section Ninth shall be borne by the undersigned.
T E N T H : The Surety shall have the exclusive right for itself and for the undersigned to decide and determine whether any claim, demand suit or judgment upon
said Bond or Bonds shall, on the basis of liability, expediency or otherwise, be paid, settled, defended or appealed, and its determination shall be final, conclusive and
binding upon the undersigned (except is provided m Section timth (c) hereof), and any loss, costs, charges, expense or liability thereby sustained or incurred, as well as
any and ail disbursements on account of costs, expenses and attorneys fees deemed necessary or advisable bv the Surety, shall be borne and paid immediately by the
undersigned, together with legal interest. In the event of any payment, settlement, compromise or investigation, an itemized statement of the payment, loss, costs,
damages, expenses or attorneys' fees, sworn to by any officer of the Surety or the voucher or vouchers or other evidence of such payment, settlement or compromise,
shall be prima facie evidence of the fact and extent of the liability of the undersigned to the Surety in any claim or suit hereunder and in any and ail matters arising
between the undersigned and the Surety.
E L E V E N T H : The Surety is further authorized and empowered to advance money or to guarantee loans to the Contractor which the Surety may see fit to advance
to said Contractor for the purpose of any contract referred to in or guaranteed by said Bond or Bonds: and ail money so loaned or advanced and all costs, attorneys fees
and expenses incurred by the Surety m relation thereto, unless repaid with legal interest when due, shall be conclusively presumed to be a loss by the Surety for which
each and ail of the undersigned shall be responsible, notwithstanding said money or any part thereof so loaned or advanced to the Contractor lor the purpose of any
such contract should not be so used by the Contractor. The undersigned hereby waive ail notice of such advance or loan, or of any default or any other act or acts giving
rise to any claim under any said Bond or Bonds, and waive notice of any and ail liability of the Surety under any said Bond or Bonds or any and all liability on the part of
the undersigned to the effect and end that each of the undersigned shall be and continue liable to the Surety hereunder notwithstanding any notice of any kind to which
the undersigned might have been or be entitled and notwithstanding any defenses which the undersigned might have been or be entitled to make
T W E L F T H : No assent, assignment, change in time or manner of payment or other change or extension in the terms of any 8ond or of any contract referred to in
such Bond or in the general conditions, plans or specifications incorporated in such contract, granted Oi authorized by the Surety or the refusal to so gfant or authorize,
shall release, discnarge or in any manner whatsoever affect the obligations assumed by the undersigned in executing this Agreement of Indemnity This Agreement shall
aooly to any and ail renewal, continuation or substitution bonds executed by the Surety The Surety shall not be required to notify or obtain the approval or consent :f
the unae«signed orior to granting, authorizing or executing any assent, assignment, change or extension.
T H I R T E E N T H - Until the Surety shall have been furmsned with competent legal evidence ot its discharge without loss from any and all 3onos. •he Surety stall
have 'he ngrt at all times *o free access to the books, records and accounts of each or the undersigned for the ouroose of examining *he same £jch of the jndcsigned
lereoy authorizes and reouests any and all deoositones in which funds of any of the undersigned may be deposited *o furnish to the Surety 'he mount 21 sucn oeoosits
as of any date r ;ouested and any person firm or corporation doing business with the undersigned is hereby authorized to furnish any information -eouested 3y the
Surety concerning any transaction The Surety may furnish cooies of any and all statements, agreements and financial statements and any nformanon whicn it iow has
or may herearter obtain concerning each of the undersigned, to other persons or companies for the purpose of procuring co suretyship or reinsurance or of advising inter
ested oersons :r companies.
F O U R T E E N T H : Each of the undersigned does hereby waive all right to claim any prooerty, including homestead as exempt from levy, execution sale or other
legal process under the 'aw of any state, province or other government as against the rights oi the Surety to proceed against the same 'or indemnity hereunder
F I F T E E N T H : The Surety shall have every right and remedy which a personal surety without compensation would have, including the ngnt to secure its discharge
from the suretys.hio. 3nd nothing herein contained shall be considered or construed Jo waive, abridge or dimmish any right or remedy wmch the Surety might have if this
instrument «ere not executed. The undersigned will on request of the Surety procure the discharge of the Surety from any 8onds. and all liability by reason thereof.
Seoarate suits may be brought hereunder as causes of action mav accrue, and the pendency or termination of any such suit shall not bar any subsequent 3Ction The
Surety shall be notified immediately by the undersigned of any claim or action which may result in a claim against the Surety, such notice to be given by registered mail
to the Surety at its Head Office in Philadelphia. Pennsylvania. In the event of legal proceedings against the Surety, upon or on account of any said Bond or 8onds, the
Surety may apply for a court order making any or ail of the undersigned oarties defendants, and each undersigned hereby consents to the granting of such aopiication
and agrees to become such a party defendant and to allow judgment, in the event oi judgment against the Surety, to be rendered also against such undersigned in like
amount and m favor of the Surety, if the Surety so desires.
S I X T E E N T H * The Surety reserves the right to decline to execute any such flood, and if it shall execute any proposal Bond, and ti the Contractor is awarded fhe
contract, the Contractor shall not be obligated to obtain any Bond or Bonds requirrd by the contract Irom the Surety nor shall the Surety be obligated to execute such
Bond or 8onds
S E V E N T F E N T H * This Apr^emmt shall in all its trrms and ijjrpp!nent<; br Inr the benrfit nf md protect my person or compiny |0imng with the Surety in
executing said Bond or Bonds or any of trVro o» eirrtifing .it the request ol the MWI !y said Hum! «' Oumi, 01 .iny of thern <is * d l .is .my company 01 comjunics assum
m^ co suretyship or reinsurance thereon
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to me known and known to me to be the individoal(s) described in and who eiecuted the foregoing igreement
eiecuted the same for the purposes, considerations and uses therein set forth as
£*>_£.'

£2

A/'Jk
rntdmf it

(Commnsen eipircs
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STATE OF _
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On this.

Alan G. Youm*

-day of.

>
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.before me personally came.

is

r- "0

to me known, who being by me duly sworn, did depose and say: that he resides in.

(hat he is the

mo

.offh»L. A. Young Sons C o n s t r u c t i o n ,

President

Inc.

O>
m

the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument: that he knows the seal of the said corporation: (hat the seal a ( ( i ^ V ^ f ^ T T # ^ { u m e n (
is such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by order of the 8oard of Oirectors of the said
corporation, and (hat he sjgned
signed his.
hiVggjffHjffiA sjjri, iQnjinT^by
nd cfrporatwyand
like order.
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Sue Marie Anderson Young
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c k- •P ,r o^d ^
u c»t s ., I^
n c -.
hat he is th#
President
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fie corporation described in and which eiecuted the foregoing instrument: (hat he knows the seal of (he said corporation: (hat (he seal ^l^f*^Jpypui
instrument
; such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by order of the 8oard of Oirectors of (he said «rpor<
wrporatffa./and_ that > ^ n,t d.J .i j^j g^j f r S y ^ h * saicTJ^ment by
ke order.
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On this
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Alan g, Yowg
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me known, who being by me duly sworn, did depose and say: that he resides in.
l e n c a n Building C o r R ^ a g g i ^ ^ / » o >
it he is thPresident
.of the. Ame
m
e corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument: that he knows the seal of the said corporation: that the se^ j ^ e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ T ^ m ^ yS
such corporate seal; that it was so aftiied by order of the 8oatd ol Oirectors ol the said corpocaljon^ and that he>r?ned hi«.i/I>»J*yf<said initrurn^jft ttxX. 5
JMfaiy Public, residing j( _
(Commission f «0*es
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1P0RTANT: Attach certified copy of Resolution authorizing execution of this instrument by Corporation.
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"° " •"- ,h« - ^ r o , a n r o,hw undersgi ned

"

TWENTIETH: That this Agreement shall constitute a Security Agreement to Surety and also a financing Statement, both in<icwr'da'nce w.th the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code of every iur.sd.ct.on wherein such Code is m effect, but that the filing or recording of this Agreement-shall be solely at the option -,f Surety
and that (he failure to do so shall not release or impair any of the obligations of the undersigned under this Agreement or otherwise arising, nor shall such failure be in
v
any manner in derogation of the rights of Surety under this Agreement or otherwise.
;

\ *w

Signed, seated, and dated this.

1st

-day oL

rffc^

ATTEST:

cr-i2nsv*f xS&ZoiL
Bv :
Larrv Gencrv, 2>ecrecary 7
Don Naser, Secretary/

ATTEST:

s

,19. 84,

January

.(Seal)

.(Sea/)

Alan Ge Young,
?rek±d^nc
LAYS ROCX PRSS^CX^, I n c . / ^

&<U^

."'

'"1

.(Seal)

-(SejJ)

.

p u e / f f a i ^ Ander?o"n7>|Youp^,

??esiiii

I^

3v:
rAJZslsUs
//tiZfaut
Larry Gentry, Secretary

.(Seal)

Cy /

.(Seal)

'•iJ^'WiV

.(Seal)

Alan G.^foung,
-(Seal)

^

iMajpaKA. Young, IndividdaL

Seal)

si_.-

Lany^ . FYoung, Prejj^ient ; : .. r^

Indemnitor

(Seal)

3v

IndiQ^ki'al 'Tnder^icor

*Usjr.sr* sft* J^ *&/.

Saundf

Young,

^ ' ^

:

=•

($**i\

Individiiai/I^t6reanitor

?Si
Stephen ^/ Young, / i n d i v i d u a l
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY^

(S«i)

Irfcietnriitor

By:.
IMPORTANT: Print or type the name and address of each signatory to this agreement. Each signature must be acknowledged
- S e e REVERSE HEREOF.

REuANCE INSURANCE COMPANIfcd
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY
PHILADELPHIA. PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY
FEDERAL WAY. WASHINGTON

PLANET INSURANCE COMPANY
FEDERAL WAY. WASHINGTON

CONTINUING AGREEMENT OF INDEMNITY — CONTRACTOR'S FOAM
This AGREEMENT Is made by the undersigned for the continuing benefit of HEUANCE INSURANCE COMPANY. UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY
ANO/OR PLANET INSURANCE COMPANY, (hereinafter referred" to collectively as the "Surety") lor the puroose of saving each and all of them harmless and
indemnifying each and all of them from ail Joss and expense in connection with any Bonds executed on behalf of any one or more of the following persons, firms
or corporations:
. ..,..,
^

L.A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION, INC.

A UTAH

CORPORATION

fiereinafter referred to as Contractor).

WITNESSETH.

/HEREAS. the Contractor, individually or jointly with others, may desire to be required from time to time to give certain bonds, undertakings, or
istruments of guarantee (all of which will hereinafter be included within the term rt8ond~ or ~8ondsl. and
WEREAS. upon the express condition that this instrument be executed, the Surety has executed or procured the execution of, and may hereafter execute or
rocure the execution of such Bonds.
OW. THEREFORE in consideration of the execution of any such Bond or Bonds and as an inducement to such execution, we. the undersigned, agree and
tnd ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, as follows:
RST: To pay all premiums on said 8onds comouted in accordance with the Surety s regular manual of rates in effect on the date said 8onds are executed.
5C0N0* To indemnify, and keep indemnified, and hold and save harmless the Surety against all demands, claims, loss, costs, damages, expenses and
torneys" fees whatever, and any and all liability therefor, sustained or incurred by the Surety by reason of executing or procuring the execution of any
tid Bond or Bonds, or any other Bonds, which may be already or hereafter executed on behalf of the Contractor, or renewal or continuation thereof: or
istained or incurred by reason of making any investigation on account thereof, prosecuting or defending any action brought in connection therewith.
Uainmg a reiease therefrom, recovering or attempting to recover any salvage in connection therewith or enforcing by litigation or otherwise any o< the
freements herein contained. Payment of amounts due Surety hereunder together with legal interest shall be payable upon demand.
URO: To furnish money to the Contractor or to the Surety as needed for the prompt payment of labor, materials, and any other costs or expenses in
nnection with the performance of contracts when and as requested to do so by the Surety.
)URTH: To assign, transfer and convey, and each of the undersigned does by these presents assign, transfer and convey to the Surety, as of the date of
ecun'on oi said Bond or Bonds, as collateral security for the full performance of the covenants and agreements herein contained and the payment of any
tier indebtedness or liability of the undersigned to the Surety, whether heretofore or hereafter incurred, the following:
fa; All right, title and interest of the undersigned in and to all machinery, equipment, plant tools and materials which are. on the date of execution of any
such 3ona or Bonds, or may thereafter be. about or uoon the site of the work to be performed under the contract referred to in and guaranteed by such
Bond, or elsewnere for the ouroose thereof, including as well materials purchased for or chargeable to said contract wnich may be in process of
construction or in storage etsewnere or in transoortation to said site::
\b) Ml riqnts oi the undersigned in. or growing in any manner out oi. said contract or any extensions, modifications, changes or alterations thereof or
lodi tions thereto:
m
mate
sucn materialmen, succcmracror. laoorer or other oerson. firm or corporation:
\c) All fjem tit!* and interest of :he uncersigned in and to anv and ail 3-rcentages retained by the ooligee unoer said contract, and any ana all
Climates, oavmems* extras, finai oavmenrs and other sums thai at the time of aoandonment. forfeiture or^breacn of said contract or sucn 3ond or
Bonos ir or :ne rerms of vhis Agreement or at the time of anv advance, oayment or guaranty by the surety or the purpose of avoidingi sucn
aoandonment. foneiture or ireacn. may be due or mav thereafter become due under said contract to or on benalf of the undersigned, together with any
and all sums due or wnich may thereafter become due under or on all other contract, bonded or unbonded, m which any or all of the unoersigned have
an interest.
TH: zicz of the undersigned does hereov irrevocacly nominate and aopornt any officer of the Surety the true a n d ^ ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l
lerstgned. with .'ml ngm and authority, in the event the Contractor fads or is unaole to comotete the work called tor by tfie con rac guaranteed &y any
id or m me event of the breacn oi anr provision oi tins Agreement to execute on behalf of. and sign the names of & ^ l ^ ^ ^ l ^ ^ ^ 2
.cher. reiease. satisfaction, check, bill of sale of all or any orocerty oy this Agreement assigned to the Surety or any o ^ J J ^ ' ™ 1 * S S m r S 21
ired to carry into effect the ourooses oi the Agreement: with full ngnt and authority also, in sucn event, to disoose of the
v*™*^**™^™*
letting the same in the name of the Contractor or itherw.se: and aacn of the undersigned does hereby ratify and ccnfirm af11ito ^ ^ J ^ "
Surety may lawfully do in the premises and further authorizes and empowers the Surety and such attorney-n-fact ?«*Mdi
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
e oossession of the toots, plant, foment,
materials and subcontracts and all other collateral security mentioned mthis ^ ; ^ ^ ^ m J ^ ^
jtoy and dispose thereof tor the purooses set forth in mis Agreement. Each of me undesigned specifically agrees to P J ° " £ ' " ^
mless the Surety and such attorney--m-fact against any and all claims, damages, costs and expenses that may m any way a r ' s e ^ r ° w 3 c ° " l r ^ ^
t o f e o i m , r S S n m e m s contained in this Agreement and the powers herein granted, specifically waiving any claim whicn
W ^ ^ ^ S X
•alter have against the Surety or sucn attorney-.n-lact on account of anything done in enforcing the terms of this agreement, assignments ano
w-fit- attorney.

ccmract *ork for which surety wouio oe i
connection with the contract.

unoer sucn oono or aonas ana lor me purpose

tistying me conditions of the Bond o**rt,.»ri ,
ouuu wecuiea i

SEVENTH: That if Surety shall be required or shall deem it necessary to set uo a reserve in any amount to cover any claim demand liability **n*nc,
suit, order, judgment or adjudication unoer or on any Bond or Bonds or tor any other reason whatsoever, to immediately uoon demand deoos.t i n h S
an amount of money sufficient to cover such reserve and any increase thereof, such funds to be held by Surety as collateral in addition to the i P mn
aflorded by this instrument, with the right to use such funds or any part thereof, at any time in payment or compromise of any liability claims demand
judgment damages, lees and disbursements or other expenses: and the undersigned, in the event of their failure to comply with such demand h-rPh
authorize and empower any attorney of any court of record of the United States or any of its territories or possessions, to appear for them or any of them i
any suit by Surety and to confess judgment against them c any of them for any sum or sums of money up to the amount of any or all Bond or Bonds wit
costs, interest and reasonable attorneys fees: such judgment, however, to be satisfied upon the payment of any and all such sums as mav be found oue b
the undersigned to Surety under the terms of this Agreement. Demand shall be sufficient if sent ov reoistered or certified mail to the undrsionec r in
address or addresses given nerein or last known to Surety, whether or not actually received The authonty to confess judgment as set forth herein shall no
be exnausted by any one exercise thereof, but may be exercised from time to time and more than one time until all liability of the undersigned to surety snai
have been paid in full
'
EIGHTH- All collateral security held by or assioned to the Surety may be used bv the Surety at any time in payment of any claim loss or exocns- whi-f
the undersigned have acreed to pay nereoy wnetner or not such claim, loss or exoense arises out of or in connection with such Bond or contra- : und»i
whicf such collateral is neld Thf Surety may sell or realize uoon anv or all such collateral security at oublic or private sale with or without notice t* •"
undesigned or any of them, and with the ngnt to be ourcnaser itself at any such oublic sale and shall be accountable to t f f undersioned only to- *"
surplus or remamoer of sucn coliatera' security or tne oroceeds thereof as mav be m the Suretvs possession after it has been lully indemnified as in » . ,
Agreemen: provioec Tne Surety snail not be liable for oecrease in value or loss o- destruction ol or carnage to such security, however caused.
NIN'TW The Suretv snali have tne ngnt a: its option and in its sole discretion*
121 To owm this Agreement o p e n e d shoulc the Contracto* become involved in any ag r eemen! or proceeding of licuication re-»iv»»snic n*
bankruotcy voiun;ani\ o* invoi jntanly or should tne Contractor If an individual cie. be conviciec o*. a felony, become a fugitive Irom justic« or to* any
reason oiS20oears anc cannot immediately be found b\ tne Suretv by use of usual methods
(b» Tc take possession of tne work unoe: am contract and a: the exoerse of the undesigned to comolete or to contract for the comoletion of the
same or tc consent tc tne re-letting of tne comoletion tnereof oy tne ooligee in said contract Bond or Bonds, or to taxe such other steps as in tne
discretion of the Surety mav be advisable or necessary to obtain its release or to secure itself from loss thereunder.
fc) To adjust settle or comoromise any claim demand suit or judgment upon said 8ond or Bonds, or any of them unless the undersioned snail
reouest in writing the Surety to litigate such claim or demand or defend such suit, or apoeal from such judgment, and shall oeoosit with the Surety a:
the time of such reouest. cash or collateral satisfactory to the Surety in kind and amount to be used in paying any judgment or judgments rendered with
interest costs and attorney s fees.
All damage, loss or expense of any nature which the Surety may incur under Section Nmthth shall be borne by the undersigned.
TENTH* The Surety shall have the exclusive right for itself and for the undersigned to decide and determine whether any claim demand suit or
judoment uoon said Bond or Bonds shall, on the basis of liability, expediency or otherwise be paid, settled defended or appealed, and its determination
shall be final, conclusive and binding upon the undersigned (except as provided in Section Ninth fc) hereof) and any loss costs charges, exoense or
liability thereby sustained or incurred, as well as any a'nd ail disbursements on account of costs exoenses and attorneys lees, deemed necessarv or
advisable by the Surety shall be borne and paid immediately by the undersigned, together with legal interest in the event of any payment, settlement,
compromise or investigation an itemized statement of the payment loss costs damages, expenses or attorneys fees, sworn to by any officer of the Suretv
or the voucher or vouchers or other evidence of such payment, settlement or compromise, shall be onma facie evidence of the fact and extent of the liability
of the undersigned to the Surety in any claim or suit hreunder and in any and all matters arising between the undersigned and the Surety
ELEVENTH. The Surety is further authorized and empowered to advance money or to guarantee loans to the Contractor which the Suretv may see fit to
advance to said Contractor for the purpose of any contract referred to in or guaranteed by said 8ond or 8onos: and all money so loaned or advanced and
all costs, attorneys lees and expenses incurred by the Surety in relation thereto, unless reoaid with leoal interest when due shall be conclusively presumed
to be a loss by the Surety for which each and all of the undersigned shall be responsible notwithstanding said money or anv part thereol so loaned or
advanced to the Contractor lor the purpose of any such contract should not be so used by the Contractor The undersioned hereby waive all notice of such
advance or loan, or of any default or any other act or acts giving rise to any claim under any said Bond or Bonds and waive notice of any and all liability of
the Surety under any said Bond or Bonds or any and all liability on the part of the undersigned to the effect and end that each of the undersigned shall be
and continue liable to the Surety hereunder notwithstanding any notice of anv kind to which the undersigned might have been or be entitled and
notwitnstanotng any defenses which the undersigned might have been or be entitled to make
TWELFTH: No assent, assignment, chanqe in time or manner of oayment or other change or extension »n the terms of anv Bond or of any contract
referred to in such Bond or in the general conditions, plans or soecifications incorporated in such contract, granted or autnonzed by the Suretv or the
refusal to so grant or authorize, shall release, discharge or in any manner whatsoever affect the ooligations assumed bv the undersigned »n executing (his
Agreement of "indemnity This Agreement shall aoply to any and all renewal continuation or suostitution bonds executed by the Surety The Suretv snail not
be required to notify or obtain the approval or consent ol the undersigned prior to granting, authorizing or executing anv assent, assignment cnance or
extension
THIRTEENTH Until the Surety shall have been furnished with competent legal evidence of its discharge without loss from anv and all Bonds. the^Surety
shall have the right at all times to free access to the books records and accounts of each of the unaersigned for the ouroose 01 examining the same Eacn of
the undesigned hereoy authorizes and requests any and all deoositones in which funds of any of the unoersioned mav oe deodsited to furnish to the Surety
the amounfof such deposits as oi anv date reouested and any person firm or corporation doing business with the undersigned may be deposited to furnish
to the Surety the amount of such deposits as of any date reouested and any person firm or corooration doing business with the undersigned is hereov
authorized to furnish any information reouested by the Surety concerning any transaction The Surety may furnish copies of any and all statements,
agreements and financial statements and any information which it now has or may hereafter obtain concerning each of the undersigned to other persons or
companies for the purpose of procuring co-suretyship or reinsurance or of advising interested persons or companies
FOURTEENTH Each of the undersigned does hereby waive all right to claim any prooerty including homestead as exempt Irom levy, execution sale or
other legal process unoer the law df any state, province or other government as against the rights of the Surety to proceed against the same for indemnity
hereunder
FIFTEENTH The Surety shall have every right and remedy which a oersonal surety without compensation would have, including the right to secure it
discharge from the suretyship and nothing herein contained snail be considered or construed to waive, abridge or dimmish anv right or remedy which the
Surety miont have if this instrument were not executed. The undersioned will on request of the Surety procure the discharge of the Suretv from any Bonos,
and all liability by reason thereof Separate suits may be brought hereunder as causes of action may accrue and the pendency or termination of any such
suit shafl not bar any subseouent action. The Surety shall be notified immediately by the undersigned of any claim or action which may result in a claim
against the Surety, such notice to be given by registered mail to the Surety at its Head Office in Madison. Wisconsin In the event of legal proceedings
against the Surety upon or on account of any said Bond or Bonds the Suretv may apply for a court order making any or all of the unaersigned parties
defendants and each undersicned hereby consents to the granting of such application and aarees to become such a oarty defendant and to allow judgment,
tn the event of juogment against the Surety to be rendered also adainst such undersigned in like amount and in favor of the Surety, if the Surety so desires
SIXTEENTH The Suretv reserves the nqht to deefme to execute any such Bond and if it shall execute any proposal 8ond and if the Contractor is
awarded tne contract, the Contractor shall not be obligated to obtain any Bond or Bonds required by the contract trom the Surety nor shall the Surety be
obligated to execute sucn Bond or Bonds

-- v»
».j ^ - J U M ui wumydiiy (uminy wnn me surety
in executing said 3ond or 9onds. or any of the;. . executing at the request of the surety said Bo.iu or w-.»ds. or any of them as well as any company or
companies assuming co-suretysnip or reinsurance thereon.
EIGHTEENTH: The undersigned warrant that each of them is soecifically and beneficially interested in the obtaining of each Bond. Failure"to execute, or
defective execution, by any party, shall not affect the validity of this obligation as to any other party executing the same and each such other' party shall
remain fully bound and liaole hereunder. Invalidity of any portion or provision of this Agreement by reason of the laws of any state or for any otrier reason
shall not render the other provisions or portions hereof invalid. Execution of any application (or any Bond by the Contractor, or of any other indemnity
agreement by any undersigned for the Contractor shall in no way abrogate, waive or diminish anyrightsof Surety under Ifti^Adrfeement. The undfeigned
acknowledge that the execution of this Agreement and the undertaking of indemnity was not made in reliance upon arty%pr^e6enta&nWncOTin|oie
financial responsibility of any undersigned, or concerning the competence of the Contractor to perform.
NINETEENTH: Each of the undersigned expressly recognizes and covenants that this Agreement is a continuing obligation applying to and indemnifying
the Surety as to any and all Bonds (whether or not covered by any application signed by Contractor — such application to be considered between the
parties hereto as merely suoplcmental to this Continuing Agreement of Indemnity) heretofore or hereafter executed by Surety on behalf of Contractor
(whether contracting alone or as a Co-adventure} until this Agreement shall be canceled in the manner hereinafter provided. Any of the undersigned may
notify the Surety(ies) at its Head Office of such undersigned withdrawl from this Agreement: such notice shall be sent by certified or registered mail and shall
state when, not less than thirty days after receipt of such notice by the Surety, such withdrawl shall be effective. Such undersigned will not be liable under this ;••«*
Agreement as to any Bonds executed or authorized by the Surety after the effective date of such notice: provided, that as to any and all such 8onds executed by<—>
the Surety prior to effective date of such notice and as to any and all renewals, continuations and extensions thereof or substitutions therefor (and. if a proposal '
or Sid Bond has been executed or authorized prior to such effective date, as to any contract Bond executed pursuant thereto) regardless of when the same are
executed, such undersigned shall be and remain fully liable hereunder, as if said notice had not been served. Such withdrawal by any undersigned shall in no
way affect the obligation of any other undersigned who has given no such notice of termination.
TWENTIETH: That this Agreement shall constitute a Security Agreement to Surety and also a Financing Statement, both in accordance with the
provisions at foe Uniform Commercial Code of every jurisdiction wherein such Code is in effect, but that the filing or recording of this Agreement shall be
safely at the option of Surety and that the failure to do so shall not release or impair any of the obligations of the undersigned under this Agreement or
otherwise arising, nor shall such failure be in any manner in derogation of the rights of Surety under this Agreement or otherwise.

Name of Surety(ies)
By:

\y/

\ /
'•

M P O R T A N T : Print or type the name and address of each signatory to this agreement. Each signature
a c k n o w l e d g e d — See R E V E R S E H E R E O F .
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befou! me personally appeared.
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to me known and known to me to be the individual(s) described in and who executed the toregoinp^aoreement and acknowledged that
he
executed the same tor the purposes, considerations and uses therein set forth as
/ ht£
hee and voluntary act and Deed

JUfjnt Q*l-?/ftX*C.
Notary Public, residing ^ rfsV/nAJ
(Commission amin»*

<L/
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COUNTY QrJ^LL^LLJL
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before me personally came
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LS''~'<nGt,

2tc me known who being by me duly sworn, die oeoose and say: that he resides in _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
that he is the
of the
the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument: that he knows theyseai of the s^TScorporation. and that he sioned his name to
the said instrument by like order.
_ -d//tots , c -TO/)/Kf&>
__
Notary Public, residing at
S~£ncnstsj~L*C*
/LJ>
.
(Commission expires

STATE OF _
COUNTY OF.
On this-

SS.
19.

, day o L

before me personally came

c
2
C
r
m

c
o

to me known who being by me duly sworn, did depose and say: that he resides in
.
that he is \Ut
of the
the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument: that he knows the seal of the said corporation, and that he signed his name to
the said instrument by like order.
- .
Notary Public, residing a t .
(Commission expires.
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STATE OF _
COUNTY OF.
On this-

>
o

ss.
, dav o L

,19.

before me personally came

Z

o
to me known who being by me duly sworn, did deoose and say: that he resides in _ _
•
that he is the
of t h e _ _
the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument: that he knows the seal of the said corporation, and that he signed his name to
the said instrument by like order.
_____-_.__—__-_—___.
Notary Public, residing a t .
(Commission expires.

IMPORTANT: Attach certified copy - * Resolution authorizing execution of this instr

-nt by Corporation.
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ADDENDUM "K"

Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-3 (Supp. 1987)
38-1-3.

Those entitled to lien — What may be attached.

Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing
any servicers or furnishing or renting any materials or
equipment used in the construction, alteration, or
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to
any premises in any manner and licensed architects and
engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats,
plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost,
surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like
professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien
upon the property upon or concerning which they have
rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented
materials or equipment for the value of the service
rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment
furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the
instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his
authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise. This lien
shall attach only to such interest as the owner may have in
the property.

ADDENDUM "L"

SWEET ON
CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY CONTRACTS:
MAJOR AIA
DOCUMENTS
JUSTIN SWEET
Professor of Law
University of California, Berkeley

Wiley Law Publications
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New York • Chichester • Brisbane • Toronto • Singapore

§ 23.5 CGL
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agree to hold the surety harmless from losses. After evaluation of a contractor the surety may require from the principal, and often from the individuals
who are owners or officers of the company and their spouses, an indemnity
agreement. The indemnity agreement constitutes part of the consideration
to the surety for executing bonds. Based on the investigation, the surety
company will determine the maximum amount of bonding available to any
one contractor. This is analogous to a bank line of credit.5
Hart and Kane, of course, describe an ideal world. While it is usually
stated that the bond requirement should act as a preliminary screen, at
times depending upon the bonding capacity available and the general state
of the money market, this preliminary screen can be perfunctory. Yet they
are accurate in their description of the surety's function, that of providing
advance credit, a function illustrated by the aphorism that a surety never
expects to take a loss.
It is important to note that while an insurer can not seek to recover its
loss from its insured, a surety has a variety of methods to reimburse itself,
one of which is a claim against its principal and anyone who has agreed to
indemnify the surety.

§ 23.5

A201: Comprehensive General Liability
Insurance (CGL)

The owner under A201 requires the contractor to carry comprehensive liability insurance (CGL) which covers particular risks. CGL insurance
requires the insurer to indemnify and defend the insured if certain types
of claims are made for which the insured may be liable. The insurance
required by U 11.1.1 recognizes that claims will be made against the contractor "which arise out of or result from the Contractor's operations
under the Contract." Some of the types of coverage required by that paragraph are claims under workers' compensation law (an employee of the
contractor may be injured while working and make a workers' compensation claim), claims for damages relating to injury or death of the contractor's employees (injuries not covered by workers' compensation may be
the basis of a tort claim), claims for injury or death by persons other than
employees (an inspector or letter courier may be injured while on the site),
claims for damages to property other than the work itself (a supplier's
truck may be damaged while on the site), and claims connected to the
operation of a motor vehicle (a person may be injured by operation of a
dump truck on the site or at its entrance). A contractor who wants to stay
in business and who has assets to lose will probably already be carrying
5

Id. at 679.
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the liability insurance A201 11 11.1.1 requires under a blanket coverage
policy. Usually she adds a special endorsement to this policy for the particular project.
Why docs the owner require that this insurance be carried? First, from
a selfish position, the owner is less likely to be sued if the contractor carries adequate insurance. The contractor is, in legal terms, an independent
contractor, a status which can absolve the owner from liability for the contractor's acts. Yet the owner may be liable if one of the many exceptions to
this rule applies.
Second, the owner, even one who would not be liable, is likely to want
those harmed by her contractor to be compensated.
§ 23-6

—Types: Occurrence and Claims Made

Historically, insurance is divided into a multitude of lines. A homeowner
at the turn of the century would have one policy for her fire and extended
coverage, one for the contents of her house and another for her liability.
Theft might be protected against by a fourth. A homeowner today is likely
to have one policy for all these coverages.
But in the commercial world there are still special lines. This accounts
for the long list of required coverage in U 11.1.1, particularly the many
types of insurance for personal injury.6 Over the years this list has tended
to grow. For example, in 1976, A201 added coverage to deal with personal
harm caused by the operation of motor vehicles. The amount of coverage
is specified in the Supplementary Conditions.7
Importantly, Tl 11.1.1.5, which deals with claims for damage to property, docs not require that insurance cover damage to the work itself. This
is dealt with by property insurance or what is called builder's risk insurance, to be discussed later.8 But increasingly claims by the owner for
defective work performed negligently by the contractor are brought under
completed operations provisions. These will be discussed in § 23.7.
CGL policies are being written where permitted on a claims made basis.
Such policies cover only those claims which are made during the policy
period, a coverage common in professional liability insurance.9 Occurrence policies cover liability for acts which occur during the policy period.
A201 11 11.1.2 docs not specify which must be obtained. It simply notes
the different types and leaves it to the contractor (or more realistically,
6

See Rothschild at 25-30 for an analysis of the types of coverage under A201 TI 11.1
(1976).
7
See Rothschild at 29-30.
R
See§ 23.11.
9
See Sweet § 18.05(D).

§ 23.7 DURATION

461

to the insurance regulators) to obtain what is available. The owner would
prefer that the contractor obtain occurrence coverage when possible.
§ 23.7

—Duration: Completed Operations

A201 H 11.1.2 states that coverage "shall be maintained without interruption from date of commencement of the Work until date of final payment
and termination of any coverage required to be maintained after final
payment" from the owner. If the contractor wishes to commence prior to
the effective date of insurance, H 8.2.2 requires that she receive written
permission from the owner.
CGL coverage excludes liability for property in the "care, custody or
control" of the contractor. Insurers do not protect property owned by the
insured (this should be covered by property insurance) and "care, custody
or control" is considered equivalent to ownership. This exclusion applies
while the work is performed. Also, coverage generally excludes "work
product" of the contractor, that is, work done by her on her behalf. These
are ordinary business risks, and coverage could encourage poor work.
But greater coverage can be obtained by broad form property damage
endorsement, including completed operations. Rothschild states such coverage was "intended to include protection against claims for bodily injury
or property damage . . . after the Contractor has closed out the Project."10 This can provide coverage to the contractor for the defective work
of subcontractors and the consequential damages caused by the contractor's own work. All that is excluded is the prime contractor's own defective work.
Increasingly contractors claim coverage on their CGL policies if owners
make claims against them for defective work discovered after completion.
This coverage, if found, is useful to both owner (a new deep pocket) and
contractor (no subrogation claims by her insurer against her as she is the
insured).
While some courts have allowed recovery, most have not.11 Those that
deny coverage point to the "work product" or "care, custody and control" exclusion, as well as exclusions for work performed by or on behalf
of the insured. A broad form property damage endorsement (including
completed operations) would cover subcontractor work.
10
11

See Rothschild at 27.
Compare Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Gollan, 118 N.II. 744, 394 A.2d 839
(1978) with Wccdo v. Stone IZ-Brick, Inc., 81 NJ. 233, 405 A.2d 788 (1979). See generally Landis and Rahdert, The Completed Operations Hazard, 19 Forum 570 (1984)
reprinted in the Comprehensive General Liability Policy: A Critique of Selected Provisions (American Bar Association 1985). See also § 13.12.
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ARTICLE 10
PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY
10 t

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS ANO PROGRAMS

10 1 1 The Contractor shall l>e responsible for initiating main
taming arid supervising ail safety prccjmkms and programs in
connection with the performance of ihe Contract
10 1 2 In the eveni the Contractor encounters on ihe site
materul reasonably believed to he asbestos or poly chloi mated
hiphcnyl (I'CIl) v*. hit It has not been rendcied harmless the
Contractor shall immediaicl) slop >Xork in the area alfcuecl
and report the condition to the Ownci and Architect in writing
The Work in the affected area shall not thereafter be resinned
except h> wniicn agreement of ilie Owner and ( oniracior il in
fart the materul is asl>estos i * polychlorinaied biphenyl (PC I))
jnd has not IKTCIJ rendered harmless 1 he VI ork in the ahcctcd
arra shall l»c resumed in the absence of asl»cstos or polychton
nated biphenyl (PC It) or when it has been rendered haunltss
h\ written agreement of the Owner and Contractor or in
accordance with final determinatH>n by the Architect on wlmh
arbitration has not IKTCH demanded or h> arhiiranon under
ArtKle 4
10 1 3 The Contractor shall not lie required pursuant to ArtKle
" to pcrlofin without consent any Work ^tftuMcig to asl>esiosoi
polychlorinaied biphenyl (l'( It)
10 1 4 l o the fullest extent permittee
indemnity and hold haimless the (
led s consultants and agents ami en»|:
front ami against claims damages tosses aiul
ing hut not limited to attorneys ftcs arising out of
ft*MII performance of (he Work in the adct ted aiea if
maiciiat is asbestos or jiolychlorinated htphen\i (PC H) ami
not licen tcmkicd harmless provided that SIH.II claim damage
|ossorcx|>cu<* is attributable to bodily miury sickness disease
or death or to ui|in\ lo or cksiciiviion oi tangible pto|Kits
(other than the Work itscll) including loss of use resulting
ihcrelrom but only to the extent cause il in whole or in pan by
negligent acts or omissions of the Owner anyone dirrctly or
induced) employed b> die Owner or anyone lor wliose acts
the Owner nu% l»c liable regirdlcss of whether or not such
claim damage loss or expense i> caused in part by a parti
indemnified hereunder Such obligation sball not be construed
to nc^itc ahnili,e or reduce other rights or obligations of
indemnity whi<h would otheIW tic exist as to a part) or person
elescnhcd in this Mihparagraph IO I <t
10 2

10 2 2 The Contractor shall give notices and comply wiih
apj>licable laws ordinances niles tegulaiuMis and lawful orders
of public authorities tearing on satcty of -yrrsons or property or
their protection from damage tnntry or k»ss
10 2 3 The Contrae tor shall erect and maintain as required by
existing conditions and petlonnance of the Contract reason
able safeguards for safety and fxotcction iiKludmg posing
d mger signs and other warnings against hazards promulgating
salely regulations and notifying owners and users of adiacent
sites ami utilities
10 2 4 When use or stoiage of explosives or other hazardous
materials or equipment or unusual methods aie necessary for
exciuiion of die Work the Contractor shall exeiuse utmost
care and carry on sueh j> uvioes unikr supervision of properly
qualified personnel
10 2 5 "The C outracior shall promptly remedy damage and lovs
(other than iUnugc or toss insured under propciiy insurance
required by the Contract l>ocumcnis) to probity referred to in
( lauscs 10 2 I 2 and Id 2 I 3 caused in whole or in part h\ the
Coniiacioi a Sub* oniractor a Sub subcontractor ot auvouc
directly or indiiectl) employed by any ol them or by anyone
for whose acts they may I K liable ami lor which the C oniractor
is responsible under C lauses 10 2 12 ami Mi 2 I s except
damage or kiss attributable to aets or omissions ol the Owner
or Architect or anyone directly *»r indirectly empkned by
cuhi r o l them or by anyone lor wliose acts either ol them may
he liable and not aiiribtitable to the fault or negligent e of the
Contractor 1 he Ion going obligations of tbe t onirai lot arc* in
additfem to the C oniractor s obligations under I aragraph s }H
10.26 1 he f outra« tor sball designate a lespousible memhci of
iitj-aitnr s organization at the sue whose duty shall IK the
aeiidems (his ixrrson siiall l>e the ( outracior s
iiinlrss otherwise dr-signaicd hi die ( oniractor
^ n e r ami Arc luted
10*s/
10 3

1 cmplovccs on the Work and other persons who mav
be allectcd thcicby
2 the \X ork and materials anel equipment to lie incorpo
rated therein whether tn storage on or ofl the site,
untier care custody or control ol the <onttactor or
ihe Contractors Subcontractors or Sub sunt omrac
tors an* I
3 other property at Ihe site or adjacent then to sueh as
trees shrubs lawns walks pj\tmenis
roadways
structures ami utilities not designated for tcmov al relocation or iqtlat intent in the course eif construction

load • |w»rmit am part of the
a> to endanger its salely

EMERGi

10 3 1 In an emergent{^bscting safety of per* wis or pi open v
the ( ontraetor shall act aNjrfVooiractot s discictiou to prv
vent ducat rued damage Iniurv or kiss Additional compensa
don or exienskin of (imc e (aimed by die < outra* tor on Kt out it
ol an emergency shall t>e determined as provided in l'ju^ra|>h
4 S and Aniclc 7

ARTICLE 11

SAFETY OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY

10 2 1 The Contractor shall take reasonable precautions for
salctv of and shall provide reasonahlt protection to prevent
elamage iniurv or loss to

IheO

const met ion y

INSURANCE ANO BONDS
11 1

CONTRACTOR S LIABILITY INSURANCE

11 1 1 The C oniractor shall purchase (rom ami maintain in a
company or companies lawfully authoti/ect to eki business in
the lurisdictkin in which die l'to|ccf is kicatcel such insurance as
will protect ihe C oniractor from claims set forth lielow which
may arise out of oi nsuli from the C out ra« tor s operations
unekr the Contract and for whtchthcC oniractor mav I K Icgilh
liable whether sueh operations \K by the C outracior or In a
SulKonttaciot oi by amone directly dr indirccth employed In
am of them or by anyone (or whose acts any ol them max I K
habk
.1 claims uniJcr workers or workmen s com'x-usaiiou
disability IKIKIM aiMi other similar empknex iK-nctn Jet"
which aie a)unable to die \Xork to I K (KtlornKd
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.2 claim* (or dam igt s Ive ause of hodilv in|urv, nccupa
IHNUI sickness or disease or dcaili«»(il»r (aMitractor s
empknces
.3 claims for damages Ixrcause? of UKJIIV injut) sickness
or disease or death of ati> person other than die (.on
tractor s employees
.4 claims for tlailiagcs insured h> usual ptrstmal iunirv
liability cnvciage which are sustained ( I ) he a |»ei*»n
as a result nl an nlicnsediiccd) or inclirt t ti\ related lo
empknmcni of su«h person bv, the (ouiracioi or (2)
In another perse in
5 claims for damages oilier than to die Work iisrll
I X I J I I V Of lUJIIIV I I I Ol ( k s l l U t l l O U of tauglhk

eri\

prop

including loss of KM lesulting thereliiNii

6 claims for damages because of hotlilv Injure tk-aih of
a pcrsem or prn|w*ii\ damage arising mil of OWIHT
sliip maintenance or use ol a mnioi vehicle ami
.7 claims involving tool rat dial liabilttv uisuiaiMe J|>j>li
cable to lite (a>uiracloi sohligaikms umler I'aragiaim
s IH
11 1 2 The insurant e required In Subparagraph I I I I shall be
written lor not ks\ than limns ol liahilii) sjiccibcd in the C on
tra<t Documents or icquiied In law whichever coverage is
gn.aur (ovcriges whtihcr written I N I an octurrcntc or
claims nink basis shall he mami iiiKtl witjjtjut intt
In HII dale of < O I I I I I K I H I IIM nt ol llu Vtoi
pa\minl and tcriiiiuaiHtuol am coverage
lamed alitr Imal pavmtul
1 1 1 3 c erlifii ales of Insurance acceptal
Iwr hied «iili the Owner |>nor to toiunienecmcni
These (. militates MUI .h» insurance polities requited
i'aiagiaph I I I shall «oniatu a pio\ision lhat
affoitkd under the rioiities will no« I»e cancelleit or allowed
cipiie until at least M'davs prior written notice has Inert given
to the Owner If am of ihe foregoing insurance coverages arc
required io it main in lout after final pavmcui anil ait reason
ahh available an atlditHHial ccitifitaic evidencing tonimuaiiou
of sucli coverage shall lie submitted with ihe hual Application
for f'avmtnl as rt<|imcd b> Subparagraph 9 10 2 Inloimaiiou
CoiKtrning reduction of cnvciage shall be furnished In the
I ontrattor w iih reasonable promptness in accordance with die
< ontrarior s mfotmation and Inlicf
II 2

OWNER S LIABILITY INSURANCE

11 2 1 Ihe Owner shall lie rc«txinsibie for pun basing and
maintaining the Owners usual iiahilltv insuiaute ()|Hionall\
ihe Owner utav puichase and maintain other insurant e for sell
protection against tlaims which nut anse IMHII o|>eratHMis
undcciln t onirati Ihe ( ouiracmr shall not I* rcs|xnisihle
fm purchasing and maintaining ibis optional Owner s liabilitv
insurance unless sjieofkall} required In the Uintrael
I ) o t tlHKMlS

11 3

WIOPEMTY INSURANCE

11 3 1 I nkss irihtiuiM. pioviekd llu Owntr shall puuhast
and iiiiiuiam m a tompaiu <n companies law lull) aulhoii/ttl
lo do biisiiitss m ihe JUIISIIKIMHI in which ihe lionet is
k t a i t d pio|M.m iiiMirjiut in tin amount of ihe initial c on
trail Siui a> well as Milmt|utnl modiht aiions ihtitlo lor die
tnun U< ik ii iht silt, on a replitimt m COM basis wiihoul tot
uulaiv tkdiHiiblts Suth pio|nuv lusuiamt shill In main
lauittl unit ss ol lit r wist piovidtd in iht f out rat i Ootuments
• it otherwise agrttd in willing b\ all pt rvms MHI t mines who
ait bent IM not M I I such insiiiautt unlil hual pniutui has been
mult aspioMtkd in I'aragiaph u lo or until uo|xrvMior cntiiv
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other lhan the O W I H r has an insuiable interest in the prt»|x.rl)
iet|uned b) ibis i'aiagiaph I I s to tw coveted sluthcver is
eaiiier This insurance shall include interests til the Owner the
I outiat lot Suhtnutratiois and Sub subcontractors in die
\Xoik
1 1 3 1 1 1 ro|ieriv insurance sluil |>c on an all risk \n4u \ lt>rm
and shall insnu against the |x-rib of pre and exit uded cost nge
ant I |>h)*iraJ kiss or damage including without tluplicaiUMi til
covrrage (heft vandalism malitmtis iiusrliHl tollapst (jfce
woik ltni|xnar> buildings autl debris removal nit Indmg
demolition ott asionrd b> enfoieeinent of am appkable U gal
r(t|uirtmeuts and shall cover rea.souahk ctNU|K.nsaiion lor
Anhiiert s vrsNes autl exix-nsrs required as a result of such
instiled k»ss Uivrtage (or oihtr jxrils >hall no< In. itqimtd
unless oiherwisr fKovitlctl m the C tHtiratt Dtieumculs
I I 3 1 2 If the Owner dots IUM mieutl i t t p u u h a ^ SIHII prop
tilv liiMiiaiMt Mt|tnrttl bv. IIH ftHiiratt ami with all •>! I I K
tutelages m the amount tkvniMtl almve the Owuei shall M I
inform die (oniiatloi in wining prnii to toiiinitiHt mt nl ol
Ihe ^ork l h e ( onirat lot inav iheuefltti insuraiKe whit h will
piotttliht luieit s|\ of IIK (iiiiiut lot SubcoiiiiatlorsandSub
sulHounatltiis in ihe Work and In appropuaie ( haugt Ortkr
the ttisi then of shall K chiigtd to (hr Owner II iht ( onlrac
lot is damaged h\ die lailure or negktl ol the Owntr lo pur
thast or maintain insurante as t k v u l m l almve wiilnwit so
iMilifving the t oniiatlor Iheii iht Owner SIMII ln*ar all itastm
able toMs pu»|Hrl> alluliulabk iht relo
1 1 3 1 3 U the pio|iertv, insuraiue requires minimum iktlucit
bles autl SIKII ekdut libit s jre itkuiihed in iht < onirati U N I I
iiienis die Contractor shall pav tosls not ctnertd Ixiause of
hdeilueiibks II die Owner or insurer int reaststhe ret|uueil
deductibles alxive ihe amounts so wknuhcci or il the
pure base ibis niMirante with soluuiarv dedue
it r shall l»c {(sponsible (or pavnu ill of
t covered because ol U H I I mciea. til or
If detluciibles ate noi itlentilMtl in the
the 0/>vv£ slull |u) costs not covercel
1 1 3 1 4 1 nit ss
iiienis ibis pto|i
stored oil Iht site jlie
v alue esiahlishetl in the apj>n
in iransii

|etl in iht ( onirati (Xieti
i ( N K I I O U M I I I I H NX oik

ipproval ol die Owut i ai the
autl also |ioriionsol ihe Work

1 1 3 2Boll«r «nd M«ebln»ry Innursncc I hi Owmr slull
puuhast and mainiaiu IM ill I I I 1 inn hint it insuiintt
it quirt d bv iht (oniiatl IkHii
• or In liw whithshill
s|Hnheallv emer such iiisuietl • «t< dining insi ill it ion aiul
unlil dual att tpiance b< llu Owi f llu m<-iu nit t <^li ill IIM IIMIC
inititsisol iht Owuei ( onliat •• Subtonii H lois mil sub
sulHoiiirai lots in the VXotk Knd ihe Owner autl (outiittor
slull K iunit d uisuieds
11 3 3 Lo*s of Use Insurance l l u Owmr JI iht Owners
option inav pun hast jtul mmilam sn, Ii uisuiiuee as will
IIISMH iht Owntr agamsi kiss ol ust ol iht Ownti s pni|Hilv
tint lo hu or othti lu/auls however taif-td Ihe Owner
wants ill rights o( J(.IHMI agunsi the (ontrittoi (or k »ss o| tin
of iht Ownti s pio|n tiv inelueliiiyeonMqiRiilialktsstN tint to
lire or oihei ha/ait Is however canst ti
11 3 4 If ihe < onirartor requests in wuiiug thai insurant t for
nsksoihei lhan I host ek s« u U d lit uin oi loi olhtr sjw 11 il h i /
aids be mt lutlt el in Ihe pio|nriv insuiaute |«'IKV ihe Owiur
shall il possible inelnde such HIMII met MU.1 die tosi tin rei I
shall ht thiigtd lo die (oniratlor In appmpuiit (lunge
Oultr
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
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BEFORE THE HONORABLE FRANK B. NOEL
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TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY, A :
MONTANA PARTNERSHIP; AND
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., A MONTANA :
CORPORATION, QUALIFIED TO DO
BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF UTAH,:
PLAINTIFFS,
VS.

LfJLMED]
CIVIL NO. C-85-8421

:

L.A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, A UTAH CORPORATION;
AND RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY;
A CORPORATION,
DEFENDANTS.
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, A :
CORPORATION,
:
PLAINTIFF,
VS.
:
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY, A
:
MONTANA PARTNERSHIP; AND
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., A MONTANA
CORPORATION, QUALIFIED TO DO
BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF UTAH;.
L.A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION '
COMPANY, A UTAH CORPORATION,
DEFENDANTS.

CIVIL NO. C-87-1984
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; FRIDAY, JULY 10, 1987
I

1

2

11:50 A.M.

3

—OO0OO-J-

4
5

THE COURT:

TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY, ET AL.

6

VERSUS L.A. YOUNG AND SONS, ET AL., NUMBER C-8S-R071.

7

I BELIEVE, IS DEFENDANT RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY "J MOTION

8

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

9

MR. FETZER:

10

YOUR HONOR, IT IS PLAINTIFF

RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. FETZER:

13

ON A CONSOLIDATED CASE?
THAT'S RIGHT, YOUR HONOR, ON THE

SECOND OF THE TWO CONSOLIDATED CASES.

14

MR. RAMPTON:

'l'5'

MR. FETZER:

16
17
18
19

I

WE ARE PLAINTIFF IN THE SECOND

SECOND OF THE TWO CONSOLIDATED CASES, WE ARE BRINGING AN
ACTION, A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
THE COURT:
YOUR MEMORANDUM.

21

FIVE MINUTES?

NOW, I HAVE RECEIVED AND REVIEWED

WOULD YOU HOLD YOUR ARGUMENTS TO ABOUT

22

MR. FETZER:

23

THE COURT:

25

I DIDN'T QUITE UNDERSTAND THAT.

CASE, MR. RAMPTON, AND IN OUR CAPACITY AS PLAINTIFF ON THE

20

24

THIS,

YES, YOUR HONOR.
YOU MAY PROCEED.

I WILL ALLOW YOU

FIVE MINUTES.
MR. FETZER:

THIS SECOND ACTION, YOUR HONOR,

1

INVOLVES AN ESCROW ACCOUNT, FUNDS IN AN ESCROW ACCOUNT.

2

YOUR HONOR HAS RULED THAT THE SURETY COMPANY IS NOT LIABLE

3

FOR DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT OR NEGLIGENCE; THEREFORE,

4

THE ONLY ISSUE AS TO THE LIABILITY OF THE BONDING COMPANY ON

5

ITS BOND IS THAT AMOUNT OF THE RENTAL HOURS.

6

IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE IS A

7

STIPULATION WHICH HAS BEEN OR WILL BE SIGNED AND FILED WITH

8

THE COURT THAT FIXES THAT AMOUNT, THE AMOUNT DUE FOR RENTAL

9

HOURS AT $53,^23.37.

THAT IS NOW A LIQUIDATED CLAIM --

10

THE COURT:

GIVE ME THAT FIGURE AGAIN.

11

MR. FETZER:

MY UNDERSTANDING IS IT IS

12

$53,423.37.

13

THAT RELIANCE'S OBLIGATION IS FIXED ON THAT BOND OBLIGATION.

14

THAT IS NOW A LIQUIDATED CLAIM, AND IT APPEARS

WE CAN RESOLVE THE MATTER IN THIS SECOND ACTION

15

IN ONE OF TWO WAYS.

RELIANCE CAN HAVE A CHECK HERE EARLY

16

NEXT WEEK, PAYABLE TO TRANSYSTEMS IN THAT AMOUNT, AND THEN

17

RELIANCE WOULD OBTAIN -- WOULD REQUEST THAT IT BE GIVEN THE

18

RIGHT TO OBTAIN ALL THE FUNDS IN THE ESCROW ACCOUNT UNDER

19

THE PRINCIPLE SUBROGATION.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. FETZER:

HOW MUCH IS IN THE ESCROW ACCOUNT?
APPROXIMATELY $65,000.

THE OTHER

22

WAY TO HANDLE THIS IS PERHAPS BETTER.

IT IS NOT NECESSARY

23

FOR RELIANCE TO ISSUE THAT CHECK BECAUSE THERE NOW EXISTS A

24

FUND THAT IS MADE UP OUT OF CONTRACT PAYMENTS FROM THE

25

CONTRACT THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS LAWSUIT, THE BLACK ROCK

1

PROJECT.

THAT IS THE ESCROW ACCOUNT.

2

RELIANCE'S OBLIGATION IS FIXED.

L.A. YOUNG IS

3

UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO PAY TRANSYSTEMS THE AMOUNT DUE AND

4

OWING UNDER THE BOND AND UNDER THE CONTRACT, AND

5

TRANSYSTEMS IS AWARE OF THE SOURCE OF THE FUNDS NOW IN THE

6

ESCROW ACCOUNT, THE CONTRACT PAYMENTS FROM THE BLACK ROCK

7

PROJECT.

8

9

THOSE ARE THE ELEMENTS OF EXONERATION;
PARTICULARLY, UNDER THE SALT LAKE CITY V. O'CONNOR CASE AND

10

THE GENEVA PIPE V. S S H INSURANCE CASE.

11

REQUESTS IS AN ORDER FROM THIS COURT DIRECTING TRANSYSTEMS

12

AND L.A. YOUNG TO REQUIRE CONTINENTAL BANK TO ISSUE A CHECK

13

PAYABLE IN THE AMOUNT OF $53,423.37 TO TRANSYSTEMS IN DIS-

14

CHARGE OF RELIANCE'S OBLIGATION ON THE BOND TO TRANSYSTEMS.

15

THAT CHECK CAN BE IN TRANSYSTEMS,] HANDS THIS AFTERNOON.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. FETZER:

AND THEN THE BALANCE TO RELIANCE?
AND THE BALANCE TO RELIANCE ON THE

18

PRINCIPLE OF SUBROGATION.

19

YOUR HONOR.

20
21
22

THE COURT:

WHAT RELIANCE

THAT'S ALL I HAVE AT THIS POINT,

YOU ARE CtAIMING THAT THEIR ONLY

CLAIM TO THAT AMOUNT COULD BE THE $54,423 FOR THE RENTALS?
MR. FETZER:

BECAUSE UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF

23

EXONERATION, THE CONTRACT FUNDS ARE TO BE PAYABLE ONLY FOR

24

BONDED OBLIGATIONS AND NOT FOR OTHER OBLIGATIONS THAT ARE

25

NOT PROPERLY BOND CLAIMS.

THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

1

THE COURT:

OKAY, THANK YOU.

2

MR. CREER:

YOUR HONOR, CAN I ENTER MY

3

APPEARANCE FOR L.A. YOUNG JUST SO THE RECORD KNOWS I AM

4

HERE?

5

MR. RAMPTON:

I WOULD LIKE YOU TO INDICATE,

*

MR. CREER, WHETHER YOU HAVE AGREED TO THE STIPULATION THAT

7

HAS BEEN SIGNED IN COURT BY THE OTHER TWO REGARDING THE

8

NUMBER OF HOURS FOR WHICH L.A. YOUNG IS RESPONSIBLE ON THE

9 I JOB.
10

MR. CREER:

I HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO PASS THAT

11

BY LEE YOUNG, WHO IS THE SOURCE OF THAT KIND OF INFORMATION,

12

I TOLD COUNSEL THAT THAT WOULD BE THE SOLE ARBITER OF

13 1 WHETHER IT WAS RIGHT.

I DON'T KNOW WHETHER COUNSEL HAD A

14 [ CHANCE TO TALK TO LEE AND VERIFY IT.
MR. FETZER:

YOUR HONOR, I DID HAVE A CHANCE TO

16 I TALK TO MR. YOUNG, AND HE DID NOT HAVE A CHANCE TO VERIFY
17

HIS RECORDS.

18

AND THAT HAS NOT HAPPENED.

19

WE WERE GOING TO GET TOGETHER IN THE FUTURE,

THE COURT:

DO YOU THINK, MR. RAMPTON, THAT MAY

20 ] BE DETERMINATIVE OF THIS ISSUE?
21 I

MR. RAMPTON:

NO, NOT AT ALL.

IF THE COURT

22 I PLEASE, AT LEAST FOR THIS ARGUMENT, THE BONDING COMPANY
23

APPARENTLY ABANDONED OR AT LEAST HAS NOT URGED THEIR

24

PRINCIPLE OF SUBROGATION, AND IT IS PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS

25

OF EXONERATION, WHICH IS QUITE A DIFFERENT THING.

HOWEVER,
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